University of South Florida

Digital Commons @ University of South Florida
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

October 2021

Employees Breaking Bad With Technology: An Exploratory
Analysis of Human Factors That Drive Cyberspace Insider Threats
Marcus L. Green
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Databases and Information Systems Commons, and the Psychology Commons

Scholar Commons Citation
Green, Marcus L., "Employees Breaking Bad With Technology: An Exploratory Analysis of Human Factors
That Drive Cyberspace Insider Threats" (2021). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/9118

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Digital Commons @
University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Employees Breaking Bad With Technology:
An Exploratory Analysis of Human Factors That Drive Cyberspace Insider Threats

by

Marcus L. Green

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the Requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Business Administration Degree
Muma College of Business
University of South Florida

Co-Major Professor: Priya Dozier, D.B.A.
Co-Major Professor: Eric Eisenberg, Ph.D.
Joann Quinn, Ph.D.
Paul Spector, Ph.D.

Date of Approval
August 20, 2021

Keywords: cybersecurity, non-malicious and malicious behavior, unwitting and witting behavior
Copyright © 2021, Marcus L. Green

Dedication
The dissertation is dedicated to my family. Thank you for your continuous
encouragement and support.
Mom, this dissertation is dedicated to you. You were taken from us unexpectedly midway
through my doctoral studies. I was devastated. I experienced thoughts of not wanting to complete
this journey. Your ever-enduring, encouraging words gave me strength and reinforced my
dreams. “You can accomplish anything you put your mind to” echoes continuously along with
“keep your chin up.” I love you, Mom. I know you are smiling down from above.
Lastly, and most importantly, this dissertation is dedicated to my loving best friend and
wife. Alisha, you are the Virginia Beach cutie who, for some odd reason, chose me. I am forever
thankful. You have supported me at every step of this challenging expedition. We are a team and
completed this dissertation together. Thank you for selflessly taking on a large part of our
responsibilities as a couple to allow us to achieve this numbing but incredibly rewarding journey.
Alisha, I love you.

Acknowledgments
I want to acknowledge businesses that contributed to this research by providing crucial
access to their employees for interviews. These companies included Tampa’s largest hospital and
numerous behind-the-cloak cybersecurity companies.
I want to acknowledge the interviewees, who graciously gave their valuable time and
experiences in support of this research.
Thank you to Dr. Grandon Gill and Dr. Matthew Mullarkey for believing in me by
accepting me into the doctoral program and showing me how to think like a researcher and
conduct fundamental research. To my dissertation committee cochairs and members: Dr. Eric
Eisenberg and Dr. Priya Dozier, you guided me through this journey with wisdom interlaced
with gentle encouragement. Dr. Joann Quinn and Dr. Paul Spector, thank you for providing
thought-provoking feedback and guidance.
I want to thank my committee teammates: John Couris, Sue Goodman, and Calvin
Williams. Your endurance listening to me continuously and eagerly discussing all things related
to cyberspace insider threats shows unparalleled support.
Thank you to my bicycle co-riders and friends, Ruben Cintron and Mark Raney, for the
deep philosophical discussions surrounding our research topics and life in general. To say they
were incredibly medicinal would be an egregious understatement.

Table of Contents
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. iv
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. v
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... vi
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
Background ......................................................................................................................... 1
Insider Threat Cybercrime ...................................................................................... 3
Statement of Purpose .......................................................................................................... 5
Purpose.................................................................................................................... 5
Relevance ................................................................................................................ 5
Motivation ............................................................................................................... 7
Assumptions...................................................................................................................... 10
Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 10
Concepts and Definitions .................................................................................................. 11
Chapter 2: Literature Review ........................................................................................................ 13
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 13
Emerging Themes ............................................................................................................. 14
Theme 1: Insider Threat Key Contributing Factors .............................................. 15
Theme 2: Identification of Insider Threat Activities ............................................ 16
Theme 3: Reducing Insider Threat Activities ....................................................... 17
Theme 4: Building Organizational Security and Training Programs ................... 18
Theme 5: Defining Insider Threats ....................................................................... 19
Summary of Findings ........................................................................................................ 21
Chapter 3: Methodology ............................................................................................................... 22
Research Design................................................................................................................ 22
Data Collection ................................................................................................................. 23
Participant Contact, Interview, and Recruitment .............................................................. 24
Conduct of Interviews and Data Collection .......................................................... 27
University of South Florida Institutional Review Board ...................................... 29
Data Analysis .................................................................................................................... 29
Chapter 4: Findings ....................................................................................................................... 31
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 31
Emergence of Themes....................................................................................................... 37
Theme 1: Technological Knowledge and Cyber Contraventions ......................... 37
Theme 2: Belief in Harmlessness of Cyber Infractions ........................................ 42
Theme 3: Selfishness and Cybercrimes ................................................................ 49
i

Theme 4: Control Measures Prompt End Users to Exploit IT Systems ............... 53
Theme 5: Leaders Strongly Influence an Organization’s Cybersecurity
Culture............................................................................................................. 57
Theme 6: Education Improves Cyber Awareness and Reduces Cyber
Incidents .......................................................................................................... 63
Theme 7: Aligning Technology With Employee Job Functions .......................... 65
Theme 8: Effective Transparent Communication ................................................. 67
Chapter 5: Discussion ................................................................................................................... 72
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 72
Insider Threat Incident Type Adjustment ......................................................................... 75
Thematic Interpretation ..................................................................................................... 77
Theme 1: Employees Lacking Foundational Technological Knowledge
Unwittingly Commit Cyber Contraventions ................................................... 77
Summary of Findings. ............................................................................... 77
Interpretation of Findings. ........................................................................ 77
Theme 2: Employees Sometimes Commit Cyber Infractions in the Belief
No Harm Will Come to Others ....................................................................... 78
Summary of Findings. ............................................................................... 78
Interpretation of Findings. ........................................................................ 78
Theme 3: Selfishness Becomes the Dominant Behavioral Factor When
Employees Commit Malicious Cybercrimes .................................................. 79
Summary of Findings. ............................................................................... 79
Interpretation of Findings. ........................................................................ 79
Theme 4: Well-Intended Technological Control Measures Sometimes
Prompt End Users to Exploit IT Systems ....................................................... 80
Summary of Findings. ............................................................................... 80
Interpretation of Findings. ........................................................................ 81
Theme 5: Leaders Strongly Influence an Organization’s Cybersecurity
Culture............................................................................................................. 81
Summary of Findings. ............................................................................... 81
Interpretation of Findings. ........................................................................ 82
Theme 6: Real-Life, Scenario-Based Education and Training Improve
Cyber Awareness and Reduce Cyber Incidents .............................................. 83
Summary of Findings. ............................................................................... 83
Interpretation of Findings. ........................................................................ 84
Theme 7: Successful Technological Solutions Align Technology With
Employee Job Functions ................................................................................. 85
Summary of Findings. ............................................................................... 85
Interpretation of Findings. ........................................................................ 86
Theme 8: Transparent Communication Effectiveness Determines an
Organization’s Cybersecurity Posture ............................................................ 86
Summary of Findings. ............................................................................... 86
Interpretation of Findings. ........................................................................ 87
Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 88
Contribution to Academics and Practitioners ................................................................... 90
Limitations and Future Research ...................................................................................... 91
ii

References ..................................................................................................................................... 93
Appendix A: Verbal Consent Form .............................................................................................. 98
Appendix B: Interview Schedule ................................................................................................ 101
Appendix C: University of South Florida Institutional Review Board Approval ...................... 103

iii

List of Tables
Table 1:

Concepts and Definitions .............................................................................................11

Table 2:

Pilot Interview Participant Demographics ...................................................................22

Table 3:

Participant Demographics ............................................................................................26

Table 4:

Summary of Themes With Examples of Codes for Each Subcategory .......................37

iv

List of Figures
Figure 1: Literature review process. ............................................................................................14
Figure 2: Literature review themes..............................................................................................14
Figure 3: Greitzer’s psychosocial proxy indicators (Greitzer & Frincke, 2010). ........................15
Figure 4: Preparing and conducting interviews (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 148). .....................28
Figure 5: Saldaña’s code to theory process (Saldaña, 2016). ......................................................30
Figure 6: Data-to-themes crosswalk. ...........................................................................................31
Figure 7: Data-to-subcategories crosswalk. ................................................................................32
Figure 8: Subcategories of the drivers category. .........................................................................33
Figure 9: Individual subcategory themes. ...................................................................................34
Figure 10: Technological and organizational (drivers category) subcategory themes. .................34
Figure 11: Subcategories of the solutions category. ......................................................................35
Figure 12: Culture and education and training subcategory themes. ............................................36
Figure 13: Technological and communication (solutions category) subcategory themes. ...........36
Figure 14: Crosswalk of data to themes and factors......................................................................72
Figure 15: Relationships among categories, subcategories, and factors. ......................................74
Figure 16: Drivers and solutions identified in the study. ..............................................................75
Figure 17: Cyberspace insider threat incident types......................................................................76
Figure 18: Cyberspace insider threat incident types and individual factors. .................................77

v

Abstract
As implementation of computer systems has continued to grow in business contexts,
employee-driven cyberspace infractions have also grown in number. Employee cyberspace
behaviors have continued to have detrimental effects on company computer systems. Actions
that violate company cybersecurity policies can be either malicious or unmalicious. Solutions, by
and large, have been electronic and centered on hardware and software. Those proposing
solutions have begun to shift their focus to human risk vulnerabilities.
This study was novel in that its focus was identification of individual, cultural, and
technological risk factors that drive cyberspace insider threat activities. Identifying factors that
reduce insider threat activities was the secondary focus. A grounded theory research framework
guided the study. A review of existing literature identified through academic databases and
industry repositories was conducted. Fifteen cybersecurity practitioners expert in the subject
matter were interviewed independently and virtually for 30–45 min each to capture their
experiences dealing with insider threat activities. A typical interviewee possessed a graduate
degree, had 18 years of experience, possessed a gold-level industry certification, and resided in
the region of Tampa Bay, Florida.
Data were coded, categorized, subcategorized, and themed, and factors were identified.
Eight total themes emerged covering drivers and solutions. Five factors in the drivers category
(from individual, cultural, and technological subcategories) were identified: awareness, caring,
devotion, selfishness, and access. Four factors in the solutions category (from culture, education
and training, technological, and communication subcategories) were identified: felicitous,
vi

advantageous, alignment, and transparency. One factor, leadership, was identified as belonging
to both the drivers and solutions categories. The findings make connections among employee
insider threat activities that are driven by unwitting, witting, unmalicious, and malicious
behaviors.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Background
A nurse was triaging a patient when she suddenly uncovered signs that the patient was
suffering from a life-threatening condition. The patient had labored breathing, seemed confused,
and was drifting in and out of consciousness. The patient seemed pale, with slightly blue lips and
skin. The nurse’s heart sank. Unfortunately, she had seen this type of patient before. The patient
was exhibiting signs of infection by the virus that had thrown the planet into a state of
emergency. The virus that had forced her, and other health care professionals worldwide, to wear
a mask, clear face shield, and a suit that looked like she was ready to handle radioactive material.
The official name of the virus was “2019 novel coronavirus” or “2019-nCoV,” and the name of
the disease it caused was “COVID-19” (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2021).
She quickly moved to her computer, commonly referred to as a “nursing station,” to enter
the patient’s vital signs and verify her initial findings. Before doing so, however, she had to gain
access to the computer. Gaining access required her to enter her credentials in the form of a
password: eight to 12 characters that consisted of a combination of alphanumeric and special
characters that were not easily guessable. She fumbled around for a few seconds trying to recall
the correct password. This required her to disregard the patient to focus on the task of getting
into her computer. After a few incorrect attempts, she gained access to the system. As she was
researching the virus, she subconsciously thought, “How do I bypass the access controls next
time to save me the precious seconds that I should be devoting to my patient?”
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This is an example of the type of insider threat incident facing many health care
organizations today: situations in which employees want to act appropriately but see
technological safety precautions as a hindrance to the efficient and effective performance of their
jobs. In this example, the nurse experienced competing goals and was torn in different directions
while trying to make a life-saving decision: Should she follow cybersecurity protocols and
correctly access the technologies in place or ignore the required steps to more quickly access the
information she desperately needed? Technological tools were in place to prevent a breach, but
the human element prodded her to act against them, putting the entire network and organization
at risk.
This kind of dilemma occurs all too often in the workplace; technological controls exist
to secure an organization’s network, but the human factor is an unknown element in the use of
technology. Understanding the human factor is key. If someone uses an organization’s systems
as designed, the organization is at an extremely low risk of unauthorized access. If, however,
someone uses the system incorrectly, the risk of unauthorized access increases for the network
and system. Worse still, life-monitoring machines on the network face a crucial risk of
compromise. The risk of compromise of patient health care, personal, and financial data also
increases.
The U.S. military and the U.S. government deal with life-threatening, insider threat risk
situations similar to those experienced by healthcare workers. End users have sometimes lost
access to classified life-supporting combat systems while deployed because of technical issues,
such as a malfunctioning common access card or computer system issue. This has forced the end
users to access the systems through other means, such as by using credentials assigned to other
individuals or attempting to access a system on an unsecured network.
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Researchers have attempted to identify human risk factors associated with witting and
unwitting insider threat activities. They have identified some of these factors (Greitzer &
Frincke, 2010), but new kinds of vulnerability have continued to surface. Shedding light on these
emerging, and as yet unidentified, factors could help researchers and practitioners o develop new
adaptive solutions.
Insider Threat Cybercrime
Employee malicious behavior (insider threat) incidents made up 39% of all cyberspace
incidents in 2018, at an average cost of $8,700,000 per incident (Schick, 2019). These incidents
affected intellectual property, personally identifiable information, protected health information
(Legg et al., 2013), financial information, criminal justice information, and organizational
reputations. Incidents occur because a threat actor has ability, motivation, and opportunity
(Hughes, 2007). At the time of writing, federal recommendations for industry solutions issued by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) included improving critical
infrastructure through a framework that focuses on processes to identify, protect against, detect,
respond to, and recover from such malicious incidents (Barrett, 2018). Some authors have
suggested that investigators traced many of these incidents to human risk factors. For example,
Evans et al. (2016) concluded that half of the worst cybersecurity incidents of 2015 were directly
related to human risk factors, both witting and unwitting. Zeadally et al. (2012) also discussed
the human risk factor linkage and how human risk factors drive insider threat activities.
To better understand the nature of these risks, I conducted pilot interviews with industryrelated practitioners who provided insight into human factors. Building on these initial
interviews, I set out to research the human risk factors related to cyberspace insider threats to
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understand the nature of, prevalence of, causes of, and potential remedies to incidents in the
human domain.
Cybersecurity social engineering incidents have been on the rise in the form of
ransomware attacks. Dullea et al. (2020) reported the discovery of a cybercriminal attack list that
identified over 400 health care companies for future ransomware attacks. Social engineering
occurs when an outside threat actor entices an end user—such as an employee in the case of an
organization—into creating a vulnerability in a computer system or network. The threat actor
engineers a scheme that preys upon the social aspect of the employee. Such a scheme sometimes
entails sending an email with a malicious web link tailored for a specific employee or targeted
group (Krombholz et al., 2015). Social engineering attacks have recently increased significantly,
specifically in health care and public health (Dullea et al., 2020). This rise spurred the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and the Department of Health and Human Services to produce a public service advisory
providing companies with information about relevant background, risks, and mitigation
techniques (CISA, 2020). Conversations with those working at Tampa Bay cybersecurity
companies have confirmed the existence of attempted exploits against local health care
organizations. Review of existing literature and recent public service advisories, industry verbal
feedback, and pilot interviews with practitioners expert in the subject matter pointed to the need
for more in-depth exploration of insider threat human risks in an effort to combat social
engineering attacks and cybersecurity attacks in general.
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Statement of Purpose
Purpose
The purpose of this study was to understand why employees commit infractions when
using information technology (IT) systems. Employees have continued to disregard standing
organizational cybersecurity policies and commit the infractions stated in those policies. Better
solutions are needed to reduce these employee actions. This study centered on uncovering human
risk factors that contribute to employee-driven cyberspace incidents. My intent in conducting this
to study was to collect data, use the data to reveal relationships among the human elements, and
construct models that show correlations among these relationships.
I also focused on uncovering data related to insider threat activity solutions. I expected
that these data would highlight practitioner experiences and could indicate how to effectively
develop best practices for mitigating insider threats. Such practices would in turn help companies
build holistic information security programs and strengthen those already in place. These
improvements would increase organizations’ cybersecurity programs and help to reduce insider
threat activities.
Relevance
Researchers have attempted to identify human factors associated with cyberspace insider
threat activities. One researcher believed disgruntlement and greed, along with several other
factors, were motivating elements that drove insider threat activities (Greitzer & Frincke, 2010).
Some researchers have sought to identify and clarify more precisely the human factors associated
with insider threats within cyberspace. Researchers have focused on understanding the human
risk, assessing the risk–return situation, and uncovering information that strengthens technology
and human-based solutions (Raval & Sharma, 2020).

5

An initial literature review yielded several human risk factors related to insider threats.
The existing literature indicated that there was room for further research. Researchers have also
shown that human motivations and behaviors are important factors to consider in a complete and
effective insider threat mitigation strategy (Hughes, 2007). Such a strategy can gain strength
from a focus on human and technologically centered solutions (Raval & Sharma, 2020). More
researcher should be devoted to understanding the effects of normal human behavior on
malicious insider activity within the confines of an organization (Greitzer, Strozer, et al., 2014).
Greitzer and Frincke (2010) advocated examining information security data along with
organizational and social data to understand why individuals exhibit certain behaviors and
perhaps predict their actions.
Witting and unwitting insider threat incidents have continued to occur despite
organizational emplacement of technical controls coupled with cybersecurity programs. Ansbach
and Sharton (2020) posited that unwitting insiders are those employees who act negligently when
using technology and sometimes even unknowingly serve as conduits for outside attackers. Other
researchers have suggested that employees facilitate cybersecurity intrusions both wittingly and
unwittingly (Reveron & Savage, 2020). Those protecting companies have combatted employees,
by using technical controls, which have often included a wide array of solutions such as
computer systems, network security systems, network security software, and computer security
software (Saxena et al., 2020). Organizational security programs have generally included
employee training programs, awareness programs, and policies. The security programs have
typically focused on how companies operate from a security perspective and have included
standard operating procedures. Such procedures dictate how companies should operate from a
cybersecurity and information security perspective.
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Cyberspace insider threat incidents can involve any members of an organization, from the
highest ranking executives all the way down to line employees. Incidents can range from
espionage to something as simple as computer misuse. These incidents place data at risk,
including sensitive, personal, or proprietary information. Other insider threat incidents include
password management infractions, which occur when employees fail to safeguard their
passwords. Incidents also include employees misusing the organization’s computer systems,
stealing proprietary information, leaving their assigned computers without logging out properly,
allowing unauthorized users to access their systems without proper credentials, and accessing
unauthorized websites.
Motivation
Employee-driven cyber incidents have continued to increase dramatically in frequency.
Human risk factors appear to be the common denominator. In 2020, cybercriminals used
ransomware to take control of multiple city and county governments’ networks throughout
Texas. The cybercriminals used social engineering on government employees to gain access to
local digital infrastructures. The criminal acts occurred when employees received and accessed
seemingly legitimate email communications. Each of these phishing emails contained what
appeared to be a hyperlink to a website known to the employee receiving it. However, the
malicious link directed employees to a different spoofed site created by the cybercriminals. This
site then quickly installed malicious software on the workstation of an employee who visited it.
The malicious software (ransomware in this case) granted cybercriminals complete control of the
workstation and effectively the entire government network. Access to the network enabled the
criminals to access sensitive data and halt critical government services.
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Companies have continued to experience hacking and intrusions conducted via humans
as the main vector of vulnerability. For example, the Capital One intrusion involved a hacker
who was a former Amazon employee. This disgruntled ex-employee accessed data through an
electronic vulnerability she uncovered while still an employee. She exposed proprietary data,
sensitive data, accounts, and personally identifiable information of over 100,000,000 people and
was ultimately arrested. This breach occurred despite seemingly adequate security policies,
procedures, and technical controls at Amazon and Capital One (Sandler, 2019).
Another major intrusion occurred when a hacker stole data from Starwood Marriott and
exposed the personally identifiable information of an estimated 339,000,000 customers, costing
the Marriott hotel chain £18,400,000 in fines from the U.K. government. Personally identifiable
information exposed included names, email addresses, phone numbers, passport numbers, arrival
and departure travel information, VIP statuses, and loyalty program numbers. The insider threat
incident occurred through a vulnerability created when an employee failed to set a strong
password for one of the company’s network devices in 2014. The employee wittingly put this
easily guessable password in place, despite its contravention of organizational information
security program mandates. Threat actors exploited the vulnerability in 2018. Some experts have
suggested that the malicious actors infiltrated the organization’s network and systems years
before discovery of the vulnerability. This unfortunate event occurred despite Starwood
Marriott’s seemingly robust security policies and procedures, which focused on access control,
standard operating procedures, technical controls, proper training, and awareness training (Tidy,
2020).
Another massive breach occurred at SolarWinds, a large IT software and services
organization. A massive vulnerability affected over 18,000 government and commercial
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organizations, including the Department of State, Department of Justice, Department of
Commerce, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy, National Institutes of
Health, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Federal Aviation Administration.
The breach occurred when an insider, allegedly an intern, wittingly created a weak password,
“SolarWinds 123” to replace the default password. Investigators have stated that the incident
appears to have occurred sometime in mid-2018, but the vulnerability remained undiscovered
until late 2019. The incident occurred despite the use of proper security procedures, technical
controls, and screening of all employees (Lakshmanan, 2021).
The motivation for this research also stemmed from professional experience. I have
served in the information security and cybersecurity community for over 10 years. During this
time, I have witnessed in excess of 1,000 data loss prevention (DLP) incidents. These incidents
involved employees wittingly connecting unauthorized devices to both classified and
unclassified systems. Employees committed cyber infractions despite policies and procedures in
place that explicitly prohibited such actions. Employees committed these infractions after
acknowledging acceptable use policies, even when reminded of those policies at the beginning of
every session on their computers.
I have witnessed other types of witting insider threat actions that involved simple
password infractions. Employees routinely wrote passwords on sticky notes and note cards and
stored them in easily accessible places near their work computers: on adjacent walls, on
computer monitors, and hidden under computer keyboards. These password storage methods
were contrary to security training and awareness programs administered within the organizations
involved. Password infractions also included employees choosing easily guessable passwords,
such as those involving names of pets, and using the same password for multiple accounts.
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Interactions with, and feedback from, cybersecurity practitioners during professional
information security and cybersecurity conferences provided further motivation for this study. At
such conferences, I discussed the state of the cybersecurity world and the devastating effects of
cyberspace insider threat activities. From these informal conversations, I gathered that
practitioners believed existing organizational training policies and procedures were insufficient
to protect organization assets. They also believed that organizations mistakenly relied on
technical solutions when the focus should be on people-centered solutions.1 Therefore, through
this study, I aimed to provide more insight into the human element of cyber security. Data from
this study could aid development of effective organizational security solutions that are more
human-centered than existing solutions. This shift could lead to stronger organizational security
programs and ultimately a reduction in insider threat activities.
Assumptions
First, I assumed that human behavior elements contribute to cyberspace insider threat
activities. Second, I assumed that subject matter expert interviewees had encountered unwitting
and witting cyberspace incidents during their careers. Third, I assumed these same interviewees
had usable information pertaining to the human risk element that causes cyberspace insider threat
activities. Fourth, I assumed the interviewees were experienced and competent in their roles.
Fifth, I assumed that my experiences and views allowed me to accurately depict the problem
involving the human factor element and insider threat incidents.
Research Questions
Two research questions guided the investigation:

1

Technical solutions include software and hardware architecture (e.g., identification software,
firewalls, two-factor authentication software, and hardware peripherals).
10

•

RQ1: What are the cultural, technological, and individual factors that drive and
enable cyberspace insider threats?

•

RQ2: What are solutions that decrease cyberspace insider threats?

Concepts and Definitions
Table 1 defines concepts and terms used throughout the study.
Table 1
Concepts and Definitions
Term

Definition

Control measure

A measure that modifies risk. Controls include any process policies, devices, practices, or other actions that
modify risk. Controls may not always have the intended or assumed modifying effect (CSRC, 2020).

Cybersecurity

The ability to protect or defend the use of cyberspace from cyberattacks (CSRC, 2020).

Cyberspace

A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of
information systems infrastructures including the internet, telecommunications networks, computer
systems, and embedded processors and controllers (CSRC, 2020).

Employee

A person working for another person or a business firm for pay (Dictionary.com, n.d.).

End user

An individual or (system) process authorized to access an information system (CSRC, 2020).

Information security

The protection of information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification, or destruction for the purpose of providing confidentiality, integrity, and availability
(CSRC, 2020).

Information system or systems

A set of applications, services, information technology assets, or other information-handling components
(CSRC, 2020).

Information technology

Any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of equipment used in the automatic acquisition,
storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or
reception of data or information by an executive agency. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, an
executive agency uses equipment if it uses the equipment directly or a contractor uses the equipment and
the contractor is under a contract with the executive agency that (a) requires the use of such equipment; or
(b) requires the use, to a significant extent, of such equipment in the performance of a service or the
furnishing of a product. The term information technology includes computers, ancillary equipment,
software, firmware and similar procedures, services (including support services), and related resources
(CSRC, 2020).

Insider threat

The threat that an insider will use their authorized access, wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the security
of the United States. This threat can include damage to the United States through espionage, terrorism,
unauthorized disclosure, or through the loss or degradation of departmental resources or capabilities
(CSRC, 2020).

Malicious

Having or showing a desire to cause harm to someone: given to, marked by, or arising from malice
(Merriam-Webster, n.d.).

Network

An information system or systems implemented with a collection of interconnected components. Such
components may include routers, hubs, cabling, telecommunications controllers, key distribution centers,
and technical control devices (CSRC, 2020).

Nonmalicious (unwitting)

Not knowing; unaware; not intended; inadvertent (Merriam-Webster, n.d.).
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Table 1 (Continued)
Ransomware

A type of malicious software designed to deny access to a computer system or data until a ransom is paid.
Ransomware typically spreads through phishing emails or by a victim unknowingly visiting an infected
website (CISA, 2020).

Risk

The level of impact on organizational operations (including mission, functions, image or reputation,
organizational assets, or individuals) resulting from the operation of an information system given the
potential impact of a threat and the likelihood of that threat occurring (CSRC, 2020).

Threat

Potential cause of an unwanted incident, which may result in harm to a system or organization (ISO & IEC,
2018).

Vulnerability

Weakness of an asset or control exploitable by one or more threats (ISO & IEC, 2018).

Witting

Cognizant or aware of something; conscious; done deliberately; intentional (Merriam-Webster, n.d.).

Note. CSRC = Computer Security Resource Center; CISA = Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency; ISO = International Organization for Standardization; IEC = International
Electrotechnical Commission.

12

Chapter 2: Literature Review
Overview
The search for literature involved online exploration of the Google Scholar search engine
and the ABI/INFORM Global search engine. An extensive literature search was also conducted
of professional IT and cybersecurity websites with the intent of selecting articles from both the
academic and practitioner arenas. Within the practitioner arena were CISA, the National Security
Agency, the International Information System Security Certification Consortium, the
Information Systems Audit and Control Association, and the Information Systems Security
Association.
The ABI/INFORM Global site was accessed through the University of South Florida.
Search parameters limited the results to peer-reviewed articles with full text available. The
queries used were “‘cyberspace’ and ‘insider threats,’” “‘cybersecurity’ and ‘insider threats,’”
and a combination of “cyber,” “security,” and “insider threats.” A total of seven articles were
deemed both relevant and usable.
Google Scholar queries were “cybersecurity insider threats” and “cybersecurity insider
threats human factor.” The articles chosen were cited at least 50 times and relevant to the study.
Searches were then made for relevant articles on the following professional and practitioner
driven sites: CISA, the National Security Agency, the International Information System Security
Certification Consortium, the Information Systems Audit and Control Association, and the
Information Systems Security Association. Articles were chosen based on relevance (citation
counts were unavailable for these sources). Figure 1 summarizes the literature review process.
13

Search

Search practitioner
sites

Search Google Scholar

ABI/INFORM

Identify research
opportunities

Identify emerging
themes

Select relevant articles

Figure 1. Literature review process.
Articles were included only if published between January 1, 2005, and January 1, 2021.
This date range allowed me to cull articles written earlier than 2005, which were probably
irrelevant because of technological advancement. This date range also allowed for a cutoff point
at the beginning of 2021 to allow me to stop collecting literature and complete the study.
Emerging Themes
Five main themes emerged from the review of the literature (Figure 2).

Theme 3

Theme 1

Theme 2

Insider threat key
contributing factors

Identification of insider
threat activities

Reducing and defending
against insider threat
activities

Theme 4
Theme 5

Building company security
programs and training
programs

Defining insider threats

Figure 2. Literature review themes.
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Theme 1: Insider Threat Key Contributing Factors
The most prominent theme that emerged related to factors (sometimes referred to as
“elements” or “behaviors”) that contribute to insider threat activities. Authors held different
beliefs regarding what these factors are. Greitzer and Frincke (2010) developed the clearest and
most extensive list of factors. The 12 psychosocial “proxy” indicators outlined include being
disgruntled, accepting feedback, anger management, disengagement, and stress (Greitzer &
Frincke, 2010). Figure 3 displays these psychosocial indicators.

Figure 3. Greitzer’s psychosocial proxy indicators (Greitzer & Frincke, 2010).
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According to Hughes (2007), attackers must have both access to and knowledge about
systems and networks to carry out an attack. Furthermore, motive and opportunity were common
topics of discussion in existing literature. Researchers have discussed motive and opportunity in
context of the situational crime prevention theory. This theory posits that an attacker must have
reason and opportunity to commit an attack. Coles-Kemp and Theoharidou (2010) argued that
the same holds true when discussing incidents that occur in cyberspace.
Another factor that recurred in existing literature was risk. Researchers have argued that
an insider must weigh the positive and negative outcomes and consequences of an attack when
deciding whether to commit the attack. This risk applies not only to an insider considering risk
but also to those within companies considering the risk of sharing data that could be seized
during an attack. Flegel, Kerschbaum, et al. (2010) referred to this approach as an organization
being risk averse.
Theme 2: Identification of Insider Threat Activities
Another important theme that emerged from the literature related to identification of
insider threat incidents. Identification of insider threat activities is often difficult because of the
knowledge of policies and systems possessed by an insider. Magklaras and Furnell (2010) argued
that an insider has the knowledge and skills needed to plan and execute an attack against a
system because they are familiar with the system and have access to it. Probst et al. (2010)
described difficulties of identification due to the complexity of psychological intricacies when
observing insiders:
Looking for suspicious (different) behavioral patterns by insiders is appealing, but
difﬁcult to systematically apply; behavioral patterns include cyber activity, physical
movements, physiological signals, and many more. Employment screening data and

16

self/organizational reported data might be useful here, but any screening for behavioral
changes is bound to produce false positives from otherwise innocent factors like
individual predispositions or lifestyle changes. The inadequacy of many existing security
solutions to address real life human behavior presents us with a set of challenges on how
to better incorporate human factors into solutions. (p. 8)
Other authors author took a similar stance (Liu et al., 2018). The researchers also claimed
that identifying insider threat activities is difficult because of the human psychological aspect.
Monitoring data are insufficient to identify malicious behavior; translation of the data requires
advanced methods. Only after this translation can the resulting data set support an attempt to
identify malicious activity before a major attack occurs (Liu et al., 2018). Because of this
difficulty, Greitzer and Frincke (2010) recommended “research focused on combining
traditionally monitored information security data … with other kinds of organizational and social
data to infer the motivations of individuals and predict the actions that they are undertaking,
which may allow early identification of high-risk individuals” (p. 87).
Theme 3: Reducing Insider Threat Activities
Researchers documented attempts at reducing insider threat activities. This is a
challenging task, but several researchers have developed models to facilitate the process. In the
development of his model, Tuor et al. (2017) observed normal behavior and then looked for
abnormal behavior as an indication identifying potential malicious behavior. Tuor et al. (2017)
believed this was the best approach because of the constantly shifting forms of insider threats.
The insider threat, especially espionage and data leakage involving computer networks, is
among the most pressing cybersecurity challenges that threaten government and industry
information infrastructures. Unfortunately, no single intrusion detection or threat assessment
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technique among those that have become widespread can give a complete picture of the insider
threat problem. Further research and technology development along the lines described in this
study, as well as discussion of social and ethical issues in employee monitoring, should remain
among the highest priorities in addressing the insider threat (Legg et al., 2013).
Bishop et al. (2010) pointed out that falsely accusing an employee can have long-term
effects for an organization and the employee. The author believed in exercising caution and
avoiding quickly passing judgement—in the form of turning over data to the authorities.
Advances in technology could have severe detrimental effects for accused employees who turn
out to be innocent. Social media data retention technology could scar a person with accusations
that would be extremely difficult to reverse (Bishop et al., 2010).
Theme 4: Building Organizational Security and Training Programs
Insider threat activities can have disastrous effects on an organization. Therefore, some
authors have highlighted the importance of developing organizational security programs. Some
related this closely to building organizational training programs that teach the importance of
insider threat awareness.
Coles-Kemp and Theoharidou (2010) maintained that insider threat planning—including
assessment of insider threats and development of countermeasures—must happen at the
organizational level. Other researchers have argued that core contents serve as a basis for
successful security programs. This basis begins with development of accurate taxonomies to
ensure proper construction of programs. Bishop et al. (2010) argued that key factors of taxonomy
include maintaining a
distinction between malicious and accidental threats, defining between doing something
intentionally (for malice, or good reasons), distinguishing between obvious and stealthy
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acts, activities by masqueraders, traitors, and naïve users, and finally defining access
type, aim, technical expertise, and consequences of insider threats. (p. 7)
These same authors seemingly counseled caution when developing security programs that “result
in implicit or explicit policies, establishing a grey zone where behavior is neither good nor bad”
(Bishop et al., 2010, p. 10).
Researchers have routinely discussed the need for organizational training and awareness
programs to combat insider threat activities. Coles-Kemp and Theoharidou (2010) argued that it
is important to establish and maintain a security culture. The authors believed it more expensive
and time consuming to reestablish a culture once it has deteriorated than to maintain it without
deterioration. Coles-Kemp and Theoharidou (2010) believed better technology was needed for
detecting fraud. They went a step further and said that training and awareness need to be hand in
hand for an organization to succeed with respect to cybersecurity when combating insider threat
activities:
Training and awareness and education are used to not only disseminate policy but also to
develop a security culture which makes attacks from insiders less likely. Feedback from
the education process can also be used to check both for policy understanding as well as
policy suitability. (p. 50)
Theme 5: Defining Insider Threats
The existing literature revealed a need for better definitions of terms. Authors have
remained divided about what exactly an insider threat is. Flegel, Vayssiere, et al. (2010)
contended that the social and technical perspectives of insider threats need formalization and
integration to better assist practitioners. Coles-Kemp and Theoharidou (2010) alleged that
interpretation is paramount: “When examining the factors that lead to an insider incident, one
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needs to analyze and interpret human behavior and take into account social or psychological
attributes that relate to motive or intent” (p. 61).
Neumann (2010) argued in favor of clarification of the commonalities between insiders
and outsiders for the latter to understand the former. Coles-Kemp and Theoharidou (2010)
maintained that clearer definitions would allow those employing information security
management approaches to better focus and consider motivation in addition to other factors such
as actions, risk assessment, auditing, training, and awareness.
Coles-Kemp and Theoharidou (2010) also alleged that the interpretation of what an
insider is depends on culture, but Magklaras and Furnell (2010) found that the interpretation
depends on organizational IT use policy. Authors have routinely discussed the difficulties
associated with deciding who constitutes an insider. Probst et al. (2010) opined that an insider is
one who often possesses “knowledge, intent, and motivation as well as having knowledge of
underlying business IT platforms and knowledge and/or control over IT security controls” (p. 4).
For Coles-Kemp and Theoharidou (2010), an insider is someone who is “entwined with notions
of trust, homogeneous values, authorization, empowerment and control” (p. 46).
One of the most important aspects of this theme relates to the definitions of “malicious”
and “non-malicious”: “An important difference for this taxonomy is that it considers accidental
misuse. A misuse is either characterized as accidental or intentional. We often label an
intentional misuse as malicious” (Greitzer & Frincke, 2010, p. 90).
It is crucial for researchers to identify exactly who constitutes an insider. I have heard
differing opinions from practitioners who consider insiders to be employees with malicious
intent and view non-malicious violators as those who simply commit harmless mistakes. Bishop
et al. (2010) believed such contradictory definitions depend on certain environments.

20

Bowen et al. (2010) argued that it is critical to distinguish between and a traitor and a
masquerader—the former being an attacker who impersonates another system user, and the latter
being an attacker who uses their own legitimate credentials. Bowen et al. (2010) emphasized that
the largest population of violators consists of users who mistakenly commit violations that are
not in line with organizational mandates.
Summary of Findings
Insider threats have continued to endanger companies regardless of industry. Insider
threats are difficult to identify, and defenders require multiple media working in concert when
attempting to catch malicious actors. This review highlighted multiple models used to identify
insider threat behavior, and the results vary among the models and malicious actors. I also found
key information needed to assist in deterrence of malicious behavior and management of insider
threats. Model development and research needs to continue to lower insider threat maliciousness.
The existing literature revealed gaps and opportunities related to my research problem,
area, and questions. The most obvious gap highlighted in the literature review was the lack of
research into identification of insider threat factors within cyberspace. I was unable to uncover
any such research using the search parameters and tools described at the beginning of the
chapter. I did find a few articles closely related to insider threats; however, these articles were
few in number and not specific to cyberspace, cybersecurity, or IT.
The follow-up search using Google Scholar returned many more articles related to the
research focus. This allowed for identification of more themes associated with the research
problem.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
Research Design
Pilot interviews were conducted with 11 subjects to prove some of the questions and
ensure the responses aligned with the expected direction of the overall research. I selected pilot
interview participants from my professional network and information security conferences. Table
2 presents the demographics of the pilot interviewees.
Table 2
Pilot Interview Participant Demographics
Pilot
participant

Occupation

Industry

Location

Contact established

1

Cybersecurity engineer

Cybersecurity

Tampa Bay

Conference (Synapse)

2

CEO/cybersecurity
consultant

Cybersecurity

Orlando

Conference (ISC2)

3

CISO

Oil and Gas

Dubai

Conference (ISC2)

4

IT project manager

Government

5

Cybersecurity engineer

Government

6

Cybersecurity consultant Cybersecurity

Washington, DC Professional network
Orlando

Conference (ISC2)

Tampa Bay

Conference (Synapse)

7

Cybersecurity engineer

Cybersecurity

Tampa Bay

Conference (Synapse)

8

IT educator

Academia

Orlando

Conference (IIIS)

9

Cybersecurity engineer

Government

10

Cybersecurity enterprise
administrator

Government

Tampa Bay

Professional network

11

Cybersecurity enterprise
administrator

Government

Washington, DC

Washington, DC

Washington, DC Professional network

Note. ISC2 = International Information System Security Certification Consortium; CISO = chief
information security officer; IT = information technology; IIIS = International Institute of
Systemics, Cybernetics, and Informatics.
22

Interview script development was followed by another revised literature review. The
script was developed and refined using information from the pilot interviews. I recruited
interview participants from my professional network and by reaching out through social media.
The interview participants were separate from the pilot interview participants. COVID-19
restrictions caused some difficulty for the interview process. Interviews were conducted in
segments, with a round of open coding after every four to five interviews. Emerging themes were
identified during the open coding. Interview script refinement also occurred during each segment
and consisted of adding or refining questions to capture data to gain a better understanding of
emerging themes. Interviews were conducted until saturation was achieved. Interviews were
followed by in-depth open coding. This was followed by holistic, axial, pattern, and selective
coding.
Data Collection
Information was collected through extensive review of existing literature from academic
databases, trade journals, and relevant IT, information security, and cyber industry documents.
This study was qualitative in nature. Based on the nature of the problem, I used exploratory
research methods to identify themes within the qualitative data acquired from the interviews.
Grounded theory research (GTR) guided the conduct of the study. This provided a solid
framework for collecting and making sense of the data. The purpose of GTR is investigation of a
discovery surrounding a problem area using data from practitioners who have experienced
related behaviors and activities. The goal of the study was determination of an explanation of the
identified problem through theme emergence. I assessed exploratory research to be the best way
to achieve this goal. Exploratory research involves investigating actions, interactions, or
procedures across interconnecting categories of information based on data collected through
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qualitative data (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 82). The actions I intended to perform by applying
GTR were identification of factors that drive insider threats and creation a construct that would
improve understanding of insider threat activities.
I began by looking at the research problem and verifying that GTR could indeed guide
exploratory research. After weighing multiple qualitative research models presented by Creswell
and Poth (2018), I determined that GTR was a better fit to guide the study than alternatives such
as phenomenological and ethnographic research. Exploratory research was the approach that
most closely matched the research problem while still providing the freedom to maneuver
needed to properly identify themes. The process described above constituted the first few steps. I
next refined interview questions that probed how interviewees had dealt with cyberspace insider
threats in the past. This step consisted of constant and iterative data collection while
simultaneously conducting analysis and memoing. Data from the interviews ultimately drove
theory-building emergence.
Participant Contact, Interview, and Recruitment
Next was Step 4, which involved in-depth coding of the interviews. Data were collected
through virtual interviews conducted via Microsoft Teams. Face-to-face interviews were
impossible due to COVID-19 restrictions. The interviews were conducted with practitioners
expert in the subject matter who possessed expertise based on practitioner experience, formal
education, and industry certifications. Each had experience in at least one of the following: IT,
information security, and cybersecurity.
I selected subject matter experts based on my professional network. Three industry
sectors were targeted: government, IT/cybersecurity, and health care. My goal was to interview
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three to four willing interviewees from each industry. I intended to interview 10–15 participants
in total.
Targeted participants were experienced practitioners within the fields of information
security, IT, and cybersecurity. My professional experience within these fields suggested that
most, if not all, practitioners in these fields have dealt with witting and unwitting insider threat
incidents. The participants confirmed this observation during interviews when they described
experiences related to cyberspace insider threat activities. Feedback from the interviewees
provided valuable insight into how human factors relate to malicious activity within cyberspace.
Each of the chosen practitioners possessed at least 12 years of relevant experience, held an
executive or upper management position, had relevant industry certifications, and had a relevant
degree. I interviewed 15 participants. Table 3 provides the demographics of the participants.
Interviewees were selected based on availability; 11 of the participants were located in
the local Tampa Bay, Florida, region. The remaining four participants were located throughout
the continental United States. Participants were also selected based on willingness to discuss the
sensitive topics of insider threat activities and data breach incidents. Cyber subject matter experts
tend to closely guard information related to this topic because of nondisclosure agreements they
have agreed to, legal implications, and organizational and professional reputations.
Participants were targeted from government, health care, and private companies in the
information security, IT, and cybersecurity industry. Government participants were included
because of the policies, guidance, and procedures used within government agencies. Health care
participants were included because of the steady rise in ransomware incidents during the
pandemic. And information security, IT, and cybersecurity professionals were included because
of their extensive expertise in mitigation and remediation of cyberspace insider threat incidents.
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The goal was to interview four to five participants per industry. Ultimately 15 participants were
interviewed: six from cybersecurity, five from government, and four from health care.
Table 3
Participant Demographics
Formal Experience
education (years) Certifications

Participant

Industry

Occupation

Location

1

Government

Cybersecurity Consultant

Masters

15

CISSP

Tampa. FL

2

Government

Cybersecurity/Intel Exercise
Designer and Planner

Masters

14

Security Plus

Tampa, FL

3

Government

Cybersecurity Branch Manager

Doctoral
student

13

CISSP

Tampa, FL

4

Government Cybersecurity Exercise Designer
and Planner

Masters

20

CISSP

Orlando, FL

5

Health care

Cybersecurity Auditor

Masters

27

CISA

Pittsburgh, PA

6

Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity Auditor

Masters

15

CISSP

Las Vegas, NV

7

Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity CEO

Bachelors

14

CISSP

Tampa, FL

8

Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity Consultant

Masters

12

CISSP

Tampa, FL

9

Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity Consultant

Bachelors

20

Security Plus Bradenton, FL

10

Health care Chief Information Security Officer

Masters

21

CISSP

Denver, CO

11

Health care

Masters

20

CHCIO

Tampa, FL

12

Health care Chief Information Security Officer Bachelors

23

CISSP

Tampa, FL

Chief Technology Officer

13

Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity Consultant

Doctorate

15

CISSP

Tampa, FL

14

Government

Cybersecurity Consultant

Doctorate

12

CISSP

Tampa, FL

15

Cybersecurity

Senior Director of Security

Doctorate

30

CISSP

Tampa, FL

Note. IT = information technology; CISSP = Certified Information Systems Security
Professional; CISA = Certified Information Systems Auditor; CHCIO = Certified Healthcare
Chief Information Officer.
Initial selection relied on my professional network. I used LinkedIn to obtain initial
contacts and appointments. This method enabled me to arrange interviews with a majority of the
required number of participants. Referrals and secondary professional contacts allowed me to
contact and recruit enough participants to reach data saturation.
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Conduct of Interviews and Data Collection
The focus of this study was collection and analysis of data that were qualitative in nature.
Interviews with practitioners were the main source of data. I designed the research methodology
to uncover data that would aid understanding of human factor elements that drive cyberspace
insider threat activities from the perspective of cybersecurity professionals. Traditional academic
data collection methods and my experience as a practitioner influenced the research design and
methods. This chapter provides details of the research design, including data collection methods,
participant selection, interview scheduling and protocol design, coding methods, and data
analysis procedures.
Creswell and Poth (2018) outlined a model interview process. I used this 12-step process
(Figure 4) as a guide from question development through transcription. Interviews were
conducted via telephone or virtually. A meeting occurred prior each interview to address the
participant’s questions and concerns. I did this to establish rapport with the participant as well as
explain basic information about the interview. The participants were informed about the verbal
consent form, interview length, basic interview sections, interviewer decorum, and recording
software to be employed. At the end of the meeting, I confirmed the interview date and time.
I used these processes to establish trust and credibility with the participants. Their
professional backgrounds were ones normally associated with a questioning and skeptical
attitude. This is because of the nature of the IT, information security, and cybersecurity industry,
which involves consideration of nondisclosure agreements, legalities surrounding sensitive data,
and constant cyberspace vulnerability mitigation. I have dealt with distrust as an information
security and cybersecurity professional. Creswell and Poth (2018) detailed ethical considerations
regarding sensitive information during the conduct of interviews (p. 151).
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Determine openended research
questions to be
answered

Obtain consent from
participant

As an interviewer,
follow good interview
procerdures

Identify interviewees
based on purposeful
sampling procedures

Locate a distraction
free place for
interviews

Decide transcription
logistics

Distinguish type of
intervew based on
mode and
interactions

Refine interview
procedures through
pilot testing

Collect data using
adequate recording
procedures

Design and use an
interview protocol to
guide interactions

Figure 4. Preparing and conducting interviews (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 148).
Interviews were scheduled by sending electronic invitations using Microsoft Teams. The
invitations allowed me to effectively schedule the interviews and receive interview confirmation
from participants. Upon joining each interview, I asked the participant to verbally reaffirm their
consent to be interviewed. The verbal consent form is located in Appendix A. Next, I informed
the participant my video would be disabled. This limited my biasing of the participants’ answers
with my nonverbal cues.
Each interview lasted approximately 30–45 min and was recorded using a digital voice
recorder or Otter.ai. All data were coded and analyzed. The complete interview schedule is
provided in Appendix B.
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I recorded each interview using Otter.ai, which recorded the interview and provided realtime transcription of the interview. The transcript was emailed to the participant, as a Microsoft
Word document, at the completion of the interview to allow the interviewee to identify any
sensitive information they may have errantly disclosed during the interview. The participant was
instructed to highlight any sensitive information that required removal. All interviewees were
provided with their transcripts for review. One interviewee redacted information deemed
sensitive. The information was less than 3% of their transcript and pertained to a cybersecurity
data breach.
University of South Florida Institutional Review Board
On January 7, 2021, the University of South Florida Institutional Review Board provide
an exemption for this study, which allowed the study to proceed. The assigned study number is
001991. The approval letter appears in Appendix C.
Data Analysis
The transcription software, Otter.ai, simultaneously recorded and transcribed as each
interview was occurring. The software transcription was based on sounds the software perceived
as certain words, which then matched the words contained in its database. This often produced a
transcript that I had to scrub to ensure the transcript reflected the words actually spoken by the
interviewee. This step was accomplished by listening to the recording and simultaneously
scrubbing the words of inaccuracies. This obliged me to relisten to each interview. As an
unanticipated benefit, this allowed for memoing of key thoughts and identification of emerging
themes.
The coding was conducted using a multi-faceted approach which included open, holistic,
axial, pattern, and selective coding methods which followed Saldaña’s (2016) code-to-theory
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process (Figure 5). I used NVivo software to assist with finding connections among the data,
which helped me gain a deeper understanding of factors related to employee insider threat
incidents. I also used NVivo as a repository for the interview data. Upon completing coding, I
sought to formulate a substantive-level theory to explain the factors and drivers connected to
cyberspace insider threats. The final step was presenting the themes that emerged as actions and
models. Data were compiled and analyzed, and a construct was developed through a lens of
sensemaking.

Figure 5. Saldaña’s code to theory process (Saldaña, 2016).
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Chapter 4: Findings
Overview
Open coding was performed to understand the data and where the data might later fit. The
data were then refined further into codes that were similar in nature. An example of this was the
grouping of the codes “social engineering” and “ransomware”; although these have different
meanings, they are closely related. Over 500 codes were identified at the completion of all
coding. Figure 6 depicts visually the crosswalk from original data through the end point of the
eight identified themes.

Figure 6. Data-to-themes crosswalk.
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The codes were then placed into two categories based on the research questions. The first
category, drivers, includes codes that relate to why employees committed cyberspace insider
threat infractions. Figure 7 depicts the crosswalk from data to subcategories. The drivers
category corresponds to RQ1: What are the cultural, technological, and individual factors that
drive and enable cyberspace insider threats? The second category, solutions, includes codes that
relate to ways companies could reduce cyber incidents and improve cyber hygiene. The solutions
category corresponds to RQ2: What are solutions that reduce cyberspace insider threats?

Figure 7. Data-to-subcategories crosswalk.
During the second cycle of the coding, the drivers category was divided into
subcategories: individual, technological, organizational, and external factors (Figure 8). The third
subcategory, organizational, began as a cultural subcategory but changed during the coding
process. The fourth subcategory, external factors, was created to represent factors that drove
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insider threats but that were outside the organization (e.g., family). During coding, subcategory
codes were reviewed to identify a central theme related to each specific subcategory. Thematic
naming occurred for the external factors subcategory because this subcategory seemed to lack a
central theme.

Category:
Drivers

Subcategory:
Individual

Subcategory:
Technological

Subcategory:
Organizational

Subcategory:
External factors

Figure 8. Subcategories of the drivers category.
The individual drivers subcategory includes codes related to employees as individuals
and factors that drive employees to commit cyber infractions. Coding the data led to the creation
of three themes for this subcategory. The three themes concern factors related to three types of
coded insider threat actions: unwitting and unmalicious, witting and unmalicious, and witting
and malicious (Figure 9). Theme 1, employees lacking foundational technological knowledge
unwittingly commit cyber contraventions, covers individual unwitting and benign incident
factors. Theme 2, cyber infractions are sometimes committed in the belief no harm will come to
others, covers individual witting and benign incident factors. Theme 3, selfishness becomes the
dominant behavioral factor when employees commit malicious cybercrimes, covers individual
witting and malicious incident factors.
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Subcategory:
Individual

Theme 1:
Employees lacking
foundational technological
knowledge unwittingly
commit cyber contraventions.

Theme 2:
Cyber infractions are
sometimes committed with a
belief harm will not come to
others.

Theme 3
Selfishness becomes the
dominant behavioral factor
when employees commit
malicious cybercrimes.

Figure 9. Individual subcategory themes.
The technological drivers subcategory contains codes related to factors from the
technological realm that drive an employee to commit a cyber infraction. Coding the data led to
the creation of one theme for this area, Theme 4: Well-intended technological control measures
sometimes prompt end users to exploit IT systems (Figure 10). The organizational drivers
subcategory contains codes related to factors from employees’ organizations that drive
employees to commit cyber infractions. Coding the data led to the creation of one theme for this
area, Theme 5: Leaders strongly influence compliance in an organization’s cybersecurity culture
(Figure 10).
Subcategory:
Technological

Subcategory:
Organizational

Theme 4:
Well-intended technological
control measures sometimes
prompt end-usrs to exploit
information technology
systems.

Theme 5:
Leaders strongly
influence an
organization’s
cybersecurity culture

Figure 10. Technological and organizational (drivers category) subcategory themes.
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The solutions category was identified during the second cycle of coding. This category
corresponds to RQ2 and its focus on solutions that reduce cyberspace insider threats. The
solutions subcategories created were culture, education and training, technological, and
communication (Figure 11).

Category:
Solutions

Subcategory:
Culture

Subcategory:
Education and
Training

Subcategory:
Technological

Subcategory:
Communication

Figure 11. Subcategories of the solutions category.
In conjunction with code discovery, I developed subcategories based on the number of
codes and logical connections. For example, the education and training subcategory has
numerous associated codes. As with the drivers category and subcategories, the solutions codes
were reviewed for central themes and connections.
A central theme was chosen for each subcategory, with the exeception of the culture
subcategory. This subcategory is closely related to the organizational subcategory of the drivers
category. Therefore, the subcategories of organizational drivers and culture solutions remained
separated but fell under the same theme, Theme 5: Leaders strongly influence an organization’s
cybersecurity culture (Figure 12). This stemmed from the strong linkage among leadership,
culture, and organization from the drivers and solutions categories.
The education and training subcategory contains codes related to solutions that
companies could implement that would reduce insider threat activities. Coding the data
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uncovered Theme 6: Real-life, scenario-based, education and training improve cyber awareness
and reduce cyber incidents (Figure 12).

Subcategory:
Culture

Subcategory:
Education and Training

Theme 5:
Leaders strongly
influence an
organization’s
cybersecurity culture.

Theme 6:
Real-life scenario-based
education and training
improve cyber
awareness and reduce
cyber incidents.

Figure 12. Culture and education and training subcategory themes.
Theme 7, successful technological solutions align technology with employee job
functions, was created to cover codes related to the technological subcategory of the solutions
category. Theme 8, transparent communication effectiveness determines an organization’s
cybersecurity posture, was developed to cover codes related to the communication subcategory
of the solutions category (Figure 13).

Subcategory:
Technological

Subcategory:
Communication

Theme 7:
Successful technological
solutions align technology
with employee job
functions.

Theme 8:
Transparent
communication
effectiveness determines
an organization’s
cybersecurity posture.

Figure 13. Technological and communication (solutions category) subcategory themes.
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Emergence of Themes
Table 4 summarizes the themes and subcategories and provides examples of the codes
within each subcategory.
Theme 1: Technological Knowledge and Cyber Contraventions
Interviewees provided answers that indicated employees who lacked foundational
technological knowledge sometimes unwittingly committed cyber infractions. The individual
subcategory of the driver category corresponded to Theme 1. There were 23 codes for this
theme, including the following:
•

age

•

awareness

•

familiarity

•

ignorance

•

lack of training

Codes for this theme accounted for 11% of codes in the driver category. In this context,
“unwittingly” refers to an employee unintentionally performing an action considered a security
violation.
Table 4
Summary of Themes With Examples of Codes for Each Subcategory
Subcategory (category)

Codes

Theme 1: Employees lacking foundational technological knowledge unwittingly commit cyber
contraventions
Individual (driver)

Age, awareness, familiarity, ignorance, lack of training
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Table 4 (Continued)
Theme 2: Cyber infractions are sometimes committed with a belief harm will not come to others
Individual (driver)

Attention, caring (lack of), complacency, ethical dilemma, getting the
job done, non-malicious, social engineering, stress, trust (individual)

Theme 3: Selfishness becomes the dominant behavioral factor when employees commit malicious
cybercrimes
Individual (driver)

Addiction, destruction, disgruntlement, embezzlement, financial
reward, espionage, inconvenience, personal gain, rationalization,
risk, selfishness

Theme 4: Well-intended technological control measures sometimes prompt end users to exploit
information technology systems
Technological (driver)

Access, audit, authentication, computer literacy, cross-domain
violations, misuse system, outdated technology, technical control,
use own technology

Theme 5: Leaders strongly influence an organization’s cybersecurity culture
Organizational (driver)

Environment, guidance (lack of), leadership, location, not prosecuted,
organizational size, organizational structure, culture, definition,
training deficient

Cultural (solution)

Active management, celebrate wins, culture, do the right thing, insider
identification, leadership, mental manipulation, organizational
structure, shared responsibility, treat people with dignity, trust,
written policy

Theme 6: Real-life scenario-based education and training improve cyber awareness and reduce cyber
incidents
Education and training (solution) Awareness, education, phishing exercises, training, unique ideas
Theme 7: Successful technological solutions align technology with employee job functions
Technology (solution)

Access control, mitigation, security monitoring, technical controls,
technology fit people, technology funding, vetting

Theme 8: Transparent communication effectiveness determines an organization’s cybersecurity posture
Communication (solution)

Buy-in, discussion, employee feedback, employees part of solution,
positive reinforcement, relationships, see and say something, stress
cyber importance, understand the why

“Not knowing” and “ignorance” are two of the codes that support this unwitting theme.
Interviewees relayed experiences of dealing with new employees who did not know about
security standards or policies. Participants spoke of new employees whose lack of training led
them to unwittingly perform actions in breach of organizational cybersecurity policies. This
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training deficiency sometimes occurred in new employees and sometimes in employees who
moved from one role to another within a company. These employees lacked the time needed to
attend proper cybersecurity training. Employees also suffered from training deficiencies when
they received substandard or incorrect training within the organization. Interviewees flagged
outdated training that did not address the risks of current methods used by threat actors to exploit
unsuspecting employees. All of this could lead to lack of awareness. One interviewee talked
about this deficiency: “People just not are not knowing the internals of how systems work so
most of like the system admins I know aren’t aware.”
“Uncertainty” was another code highlighted by interviewees that supports Theme 1.
Employees were sometimes unsure of what steps to be take in certain situations, such as a
phishing attempt. In this scenario, an employee might open a suspicious email and respond to the
email or click on a malicious link in the email.
Participants pointed to a lack of understanding that contributed to unwitting cyber
infractions. This sometimes occurred with newly hired employees who lacked the time needed to
comprehend security policies and standards. This also occurred with employees who were
unfamiliar with—or not well-versed in using—a specific technology. Lack of understanding was
also a factor when employees encountered technical issues not previously experienced or issues
not presented or addressed during training scenarios. One interviewee talked about how an
employee’s lack of understanding contributed to malicious attacks:
In January, we were under a massive phishing campaign. And one of our users. I did
indeed fall for the campaign. And subsequently, you know, due to people, and
procedures, we’ve put in place years ago. It contained the threat immediately but the
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issue that the main catalyst of that incident was, I’d say, not ignorance, but a lack of
understanding.
A factor discussed by the interviewees that is closely related to lack of understanding is
lack of familiarity. This applies to employees who are new to a position or using updated
technology. Participants also reported seeing this sometimes when an employee received a new
computer or software and did not know how to use the technology. One respondent spoke of a
cyber incident and how it stemmed from a lack of understanding on the part of an employee: “I
think for them, it was it wasn’t it wasn’t malicious, I think he was probably a that not really
understanding the data that they were working with.” Lack of familiarity sometimes extended to
using office email applications. Interviewees spoke of employees who were unfamiliar with how
to properly encrypt an email when replying or did not know the difference between a malicious
and non-malicious link. One interviewee felt this led to exploitation by outside threat actors:
Probably familiarity and just, you know, not not having it kind of, I’d say, a paranoid
mindset, but I like a cautious mindset on that. One, especially when it comes to anything,
you know, dollars later, you should double check, you know, sender receiver certificate,
that’s not something that I think most people do, to train everybody to do that on every
single page they visit may be a little, little much, but at least when it comes to, you know,
the Secretary sending a dollar amount. I think it just came down to familiarity and said,
Okay, well, sure, that’s how we’ve done it before.
The “age” code corresponds to emphasis by interviewees that an employee’s age can
sometimes lead the employee to unwittingly commit cyber infractions. Several interviewees said
this was a common occurrence in health care with workers over the age of 50 years. These
workers, mostly medical doctors, lacked exposure to technology before becoming health care
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professional. People in this age group often received their introduction to technology through
working in health care. Some participants said they had witnessed health care workers who only
used technology while working, and only begrudgingly then. One participant expanded on the
age aspect:
But in every organization that’s been in trouble when and I think ultimately it comes
down to just generational. I guess differences in perception and information and how it
comes. I’m not going to say that demographics are skewed towards older individuals,
because I don’t have that data in front of me, but I would be inclined as from what little
actual hard numbers I have seen that was what I’m led to believe that it’s certainly more,
or it’s disproportionately successful on individuals above a certain age special. And I
think part of that is just the lack of exposure to these technologies and emerging with
something that’s really only been mainstream for the past 20 years. So if you’re someone
who wasn’t in your teens or early twenties when a technology came out, you may not
have embraced it you know as quickly and so there’s just a gap there.
A factor described by some interviewees concerning employee age was that forgetfulness
sometimes contributed to an employee unwittingly committing a cyber infraction. Participants
said that they had known employees to forget a security standard or policy when committing a
non-malicious act. An interviewee told of one instance when an employee, overwhelmed with
daily duties, forgot to look for characteristics associated with a phishing email and clicked on a
link embedded within an email. The employee said it was a mistake and that they had simply
forgotten the company’s protocol.
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Theme 2: Belief in Harmlessness of Cyber Infractions
A major theme that became evident during the coding process concerned employees who
wittingly and benignly committed cybersecurity incidents. These individuals sometimes
committed cyber infractions believing that no harm would come to others. The individual
subcategory of the driver category corresponded to Theme 2. There were 48 codes for this
theme, including the following:
•

attention

•

caring (lack of)

•

complacency

•

ethical dilemma

•

getting the job done

•

non-malicious

•

social engineering

•

stress

•

trust (individual)

Codes from this theme accounted for 22% of codes for the driver category. The workers alluded
to by this theme do not intentionally intend to harm others, either inside or outside their
organizations. The codes contributing to this theme were by far the codes most discussed by the
interviewees. Actions covered by this theme are those that do not seem malicious but are still
committed knowingly and willingly. These actions indicate that employees know the actions are
wrong but do not believe them wrong or drastic enough to hurt others.
One of the recurring codes in the interview data concerns employees who want to meet
responsibilities associated with their positions. One interviewee said employees in this category
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were mainly concerned about “getting the job done.” Employees wanting to meet their
responsibilities did not maliciously commit cybersecurity violations; they were more concerned
about trying to accomplish their assigned duties. Participants from the health care industry often
saw this phenomenon when nurses bypassed security standards to provide care to patients.
Participants also observed this phenomenon in employees who accessed IT systems with willing
coworkers’ login credentials to accomplish everyday tasks after losing access with their own
credentials. One participant discussed the mindset of some health care workers:
I would point to is you have a we have a lot of physicians right we have, we have
thousands of physicians that work for health system, and they are you know they really
are focused on practicing medicine and they’re trying to do things very quickly.
Employees accomplishing assigned tasks are closely related to another code uncovered
during the study: Participants noted that some employees commit cybersecurity infractions while
trying to assist other people. This phenomenon was normally evident when an employee wanted
to help a coworker or supervisor but knew that they would violate a cybersecurity standard by
doing so. One interviewee said this occurred when someone impersonating an employee’s
supervisor informed the employee that he needed assistance purchasing gift cards for a client.
The employee responded to the request through an email, purchased gift cards worth a large sum,
and sent them to the supervisor, following instructions provided in the original email. The
employee was unaware she had communicated with a malicious threat actor masquerading as her
supervisor.
An employee’s desire to assist others can lead to cyber infractions. Participants described
employees who used their own unapproved technology because they felt more comfortable with
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their technology than with the technology solution approved by the organization. One
interviewee told of issues his cyber teams encountered:
So the challenges I have are, you know people are setting their ways. And I find that in
health care, people are entrenched in their workflows and they are not willing to change
or adjust. Now I’m not saying they meaning everyone, I’m meaning there’s a significant
percentage of the population and health care that are not willing to change the way they
do things in order to enhance or improve cybersecurity for the organization.
Interviewees provided numerous accounts of employees who had fallen victim to social
engineering scams. The corresponding code linked to a significant quantity of data involving
employees who knowingly bypassed security standards to assist themselves or others. One
participant reflected
that there will naturally be people that work around some controls for or shortcut them to
just deliver care so I think their, their heart is in the right place but their head is not. And,
and sometimes that’s just a matter of of education, sometimes they don’t know that,
leaving their workstation, open, because it’s, They can, they can treat a patient come
back, not have to put their credentials back in and just go faster, and see more people that
that you know that that’s a good thing but, you know, leaving the workstation open and
somebody walking by.
One interviewee mentioned that employees clicked on malicious links embedded in
emails offering various discounts. These emails were often crafted to entice employees based on
specific shopping habits of the employees. After clicking on a malicious link, an employee
would not access a shopping tool but would instead be redirected to a malicious site, which could
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prompt installation of ransomware software on the employee’s computer. One interviewee
explained what his health care organization faced in terms of social engineering attacks:
Something a little south of 10 percent. I think it hovers between five and eight percent of
the, you know, participants that we send these emails to open them up and not just open
them that but will go deep into the links. So, we, you know, just two months ago we had
a nurse manager that received one of these, not not a friend but a bad actual spear phish
that came through directly to her, and she was a frequent flyer, she went deep into the
link, and she led a bad guy into our environment, and we spent hundreds of hours, and
probably about 18 days 18 to 20 days hunting.
An interviewee who worked in the health care industry provided an in-depth explanation of why
the fear of social engineering attacks kept him up at night:
Yeah, we’ve had, we’ve had more experience than, than I choose to, like, so we are
constantly threatened by phish and spear phish. The spear phish concern me the most,
that, that really make it through all of our cyber investments to prevent harm, you know,
and they’re they’re the usually the, they’re just very sophisticated, they’re getting this the
spear phish bad actors are getting more and more sophisticated. So as an example,
Marcus. We handle on the front end of our email system, we handle it over a 90-day
period probably 14 million messages into our environment. And of those 14 million
messages about three and a half million, make it through all, you know, all of our cyber
investments and filtration systems to pull out known bad, you know, that actor stuff. And
still, there’s a percentage, those items that are, that that make it through to our, you know,
10,000-person surface, if you will. And depending on the venue depending on the day
and how sophisticated the phish is or spear phish. It’s not unusual to see a lot of those
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emails, open unwittingly, so we haven’t really had been our environment, experienced,
internal witting, that, that actors inside, inside that we know of.
One interviewee expressed their frustration with the advanced social engineering techniques
employed by outside threat actors:
But then they just change the email a little bit and people don’t realize the same thing.
Like even even security professionals get fooled with phishing from time to time so it’s
not a. It’s kind of one of those whack-a-mole battles where there’s no full right answer
and even if you did the best.
Employees faced with ethical dilemmas fall under this theme as well. Interviewees gave
accounts of employees who were forced to choose between the better of two options when trying
to accomplish work-related tasks. Such a choice was often between completing an action for a
job or adhering to a cybersecurity standard. One such ethical dilemma described by an
interviewee involved nurses in the health care industry. The participant said he had remediated a
situation in which an emergency room nurse who experienced problems with her assigned
credentials provided care to a patient only after logging into her workstation using a coworker’s
login credentials. The nurse chose wittingly to not follow the security protocols so that she could
provide care to her patient. One of the interviewees provided insight:
They’re just trying to get the job done. And so they’re not trying to do something that
would put the health system in harm, they’re just looking for a way to be able to operate,
what they see is the most efficient fashion possible.
Interviewees divulged that some employees committed actions not in accordance with
organizational cybersecurity mandates because they were unaware of the repercussions of doing
so. Participants gave accounts of employees who connected personal mobile devices to
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organizational IT systems to charge the mobile devices. The employees wittingly engaged in
these actions because they did not know or understand the consequences or because the
consequences were insufficiently severe. One participant spoke of situations in which employees
did not fear repercussions and said that the lack of repercussions affected the company:
The repercussions aren’t that low like that the risk is there for someone in that situation,
If you’re inside an organization, obviously. Some people don’t have that, preservation,
that we all do but if you’re inside an organization that risk of being detected that the
stakes get caught, or if you do get caught, what happened is so much higher I think that’s
a detriment or the term.
Interviewees indicated that employees sometimes adopted a check-the-box mentality that
led to cybersecurity incidents. Participants gave accounts of employees who recycled passwords
or did not change default passwords when installing new systems devices on company networks.
One such participant referred to these employees as “corner cutters”:
People cutting corners to circumvent cyber controls in order to get their jobs done faster,
or “that’s not the way we use,” what the common line I hear is, “That’s not the way we
used to do it before and what you’re trying to make us do is taking longer to achieve.”
And so with that being said, I’ve got a mixture of people, I’ve got one side that will
comply and they recognize that the controls that need to be put in place that disrupt their
workflow slightly, they just have to change the way they do things a little bit, correct
their course in order to achieve, you know, security on our, on our network and you have
another grouping of individuals that, look at it is, is impeding their their job or role. It’s
hampering their progress.
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These small infractions created vulnerabilities in the company that threat actors could exploit.
This check-the-box and corner-cutting attitude is closely related to another phenomenon
described by the interviewees: laziness. Some of the cybersecurity professionals said they had
addressed cybersecurity incidents caused by employees who understood organizational security
standards but chose not to follow them because of their seemingly difficult nature.
Complacency is similar to the check-the-box mentality and laziness. One participant said
he had witnessed complacency in IT companies with purportedly lax dress codes. He noted that
employees allowed to dress casually tended to be complacent. He explained that employees in IT
and cyber employment positions had been complacent at times: “For example, just in corporate
environment. Professional attire is expected for most individuals. Every single organization I’ve
been in in the IT sphere there in blue jeans and Metallica T-shirts.” This casual attitude often led
to security violations in the form of not properly protecting IT systems, such as by navigating to
unauthorized web pages or by accessing prohibited network systems. He went on to say, “But
more often than not my experience that for the true human element. It’s just ignorance, or
complacency.”
“Attention” is another code highlighted by interviewees relating to the witting and benign
behavior encompassed by Theme 2. Employees often exhibited a desire for attention when
accessing social media sites from company workstations. One interviewee said employees
seeking attention from social media postings were not just violating cybersecurity protocols; they
were often putting the lives of coworkers in danger:
If you’re in a big organization, you have users that understand what should and shouldn’t
be said, and then you have users who are just, you know, “Hey, my job is this, my job is
that.” Younger users especially and to an extent some older users don’t understand their
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reach. When it comes to social media. They don’t understand that a post is on the internet
is forever. It doesn’t forget. And that you really have to be careful when you put anything
on the internet, regardless of what profession of work or not, but then when you, when
you’re talking about your workplace. You have to be doubly careful, because now you’re
not just speaking about yourself, you’re speaking about the nation, you’re speaking about
the people that your coworkers, you may be endangering them.
The interviewee explained that military cybersecurity policies prohibited posting pictures to
social media sites during military operations. Those policies were in place to protect information
related to the locations of service members, which could be used for malicious actions by threat
actors.
Theme 3: Selfishness and Cybercrimes
Data from the interviews indicated employees often committed malicious acts
intentionally. These cybersecurity infractions involved employees who knowingly wanted to
harm their company or employees of the company. Selfishness was the dominant behavioral
factor when employees committed malicious cybercrimes. The individual subcategory of the
driver category corresponded to Theme 3. There were 40 codes for this theme, including the
following:
•

addiction

•

destruction

•

disgruntlement

•

embezzlement

•

financial reward

•

espionage
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•

inconvenience

•

personal gain

•

rationalization

•

risk

•

selfishness

Codes from this theme accounted for 18% of the codes for the drivers category. A common
thread that ran through the interviews was that an employee was selfish in their actions when
they placed their own interests above the interests of others. Surprisingly, the participants evoked
this theme less than Theme 2.
Interviewees brought up disgruntlement on numerous occasions. One interviewee
maintained that disgruntlement probably underlies all cybersecurity incidents that are both
witting and malicious. One interviewee discussed how sabotage and embezzlement largely begin
with employees who are dissatisfied with their present or former employers. Another interviewee
said he had been tasked with conducting cybersecurity incident response cleanup associated with
a disgruntled employee who attempted to destroy a government IT system.
Respondents highlighted revenge as a common motive of disgruntled employees. One
participant discussed an insider threat situation in which an employee was passed over for
promotion. One interviewee explained, “Higher promotion faster promotion, that kind of stuff.
So it’s really all driven by the by the personal motivator of, you know, almost like selfishness, in
a way.” Another subject explained a situation involving another employee, who showed signs of
possibly taking revenge against the company. The company responded preemptively by
terminating the employee before the employee could take any nefarious action. The interviewee
said the employee started to exhibit behavior detrimental to the company,
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and you could see this person just starting to lash out at the coworkers a little bit more
every week it just slowly building his anger and you’re like man this guy. I don’t know
about this guy. And finally, one of the administrators, from blowing off his complaint
ended up in our office in a senior position. … And so he walks out of the office, and the
person who’s now a team lead, went to the security offices. Now he he’s too much of a
risk. This guy’s is now kind of a loose cannon, and starting you know to activate his
badge. I don’t want that coming back in, so they actually just fired him on the spot.
Some participants discussed personal gain as a factor that often led to insider threat
incidents. In one situation, a disgruntled employee was unhappy with their company and
accepted a management position with a competitor. The employee began to steal company
secrets and client contact information. The insider threat activity was discovered when the
employee began to contact clients and solicit business for the employee’s new company.
Personal gain was the dominating motive in this instance. Another interviewee told of his
experience with a business that prepared food and had a special sauce:
I have a company that makes … the recipe of … [a food type] … that was just in the My
Documents [folder] of that was shared with everyone. Like the actual recipe of their
livelihood, that they won the best … [national television show award for the food type]
… and they actually exploded, companies called … [redacted name]. … So they’re their
actual recipe was … gave them the name was just share with everybody.
The participants discussed embezzlement as a factor numerous times with regard to cyber
infractions. One interviewee told of a situation in which a health care employee left their
company with boxes of patient files with the intention of selling the data to a local competitor.
The interviewee explained:
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We did have one incident where one of our chairs buys at one of our clinics, they, we had
a, we, they were, they were very successful clinic and it was successful physician
practice, and they, one of the, one of the main physicians left and hired into a new group
and hired away one of the, one of the main office managers to come to the new practice.
And as they were leaving, they actually took the patient, patient list with them and they
started calling patients.
Financial gain is a closely related factor interviewees mentioned multiple times during
the interviews. One interviewee said that in his experience the root of embezzlement is money:
You know, I think that the main drive for individuals to create insider incidents is
primarily money. It’s primarily a financial gain of some sort. The overall objective that I
see, and again this is closed minded because I’m fully concentrated on health care. Health
care networks of health care systems. The main motivation that I see insider threats is
obtaining our patient data, and in turn, selling that data for a very premium price.
Some participants said employees who committed witting and malicious actions often
rationalized their behavior. One interviewee said he had been involved in cybersecurity cleanups
where the guilty employees committed acts while falsely believing they were entitled to what
they had stolen. Another interviewee said he had witnessed rationalization in the past when
employees did not want to clear the credential caches on their computer systems,
leaving their sessions cached on there so that their creds could be stolen like okay well
maybe you can do something as simple as when you’re done doing whatever you’re
doing reboot that system, you can say it’s needed for, to get the unchanged, to work or
something like whatever you have to do to rationalize it but but it’s like right now that
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systems cleaning and you don’t have to worry about the footprint you left there that can
be taken advantage of.
Some interviewees said risk was a major consideration for employees considering insider
threat activities. Risk is associated with cyber infractions in which an employee plans to perform
an activity that would bring harm to an organization. Interviewees spoke about employees who
knowingly violated security rules, knowing that the risk of getting caught was low. Conversely,
employees chose not to perform nefarious activities if the risk exposure was high. Employees
determining risk of exposure often examined of company IT infrastructures and cybersecurity
protocols. One interviewee said he had seen employees commit malicious acts after learning of
company plans to terminate them. The risk of getting caught then no longer played a role in the
employees’ reasoning. He explained how revenge was also a factor:
I’ve seen that more in the small, medium and businesses that are more local accountants,
lawyers, even some medical firms, where they tried to delete some files, before they
while they were fired [and they] were able to do that. I will say revenge is definitely one
of those factors.
“Ego” is another factor coded in the interview data. According to the participants, some
employees believed they could circumvent cybersecurity protocols and policies. Some
interviewees believed such individuals were bound to be unsuccessful, based on protocols and
policies unknown to these individuals.
Theme 4: Control Measures Prompt End Users to Exploit IT Systems
Organizations sponsor the development of IT infrastructures with the intent of improving
and streamlining business processes. They then sponsor the development of cybersecurity
protocols to secure those IT infrastructures. Unfortunately, employees circumvent and exploit
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these seemingly holistic protocols, both wittingly and unwittingly. Data analysis revealed that
employees exploited the most sophisticated hardened IT architectures. Well-intended
technological control measures sometimes prompted end users to exploit IT systems. The
technological subcategory of the drivers category corresponded to Theme 4. There were 41 codes
for this theme, including the following:
•

access

•

audit

•

authentication

•

computer literacy

•

cross-domain violations

•

misuse system

•

outdated technology

•

technical control

•

use own technology

Codes for this theme accounted for 19% of the codes in the drivers category.
Interviewees pointed to an ongoing issue with insiders maliciously exploiting wellintended IT security protocols. One participant gave accounts of several situations involving IT
administrators who circumvented substantial company security protocols. The interviewee said it
was difficult to account and plan for malicious behaviors by IT administrator. The participant
explored the depths of the subject:
That’s most vulnerable but also they’re also the people that know the most. So, people
with admin capabilities are also the people that know how to use computers, right, the
best, on average, so it’s like okay. They’re the, the biggest weakness, but also they’re the
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ones that’s more likely, most likely to be doing something like install software, bigger
things right so they’re the most likely to be downloading software that’s not authorized
and running it because someone else can’t do that.
He explained that employees in this position are more dangerous than outsider threats because,
as insiders, such employees are trusted with sensitive information and have the wherewithal to
exploit vulnerabilities.
Small and medium-sized businesses are often overly trusting with software and hardware
access. The employees of such businesses often have multiple roles because of personnel
limitations. These businesses entrust their employees with more access to software and systems
than employees in larger businesses receive because of the greater responsibilities of employees
in smaller businesses. One interviewee shared a story about dealing with one such small or
medium-sized business:
So it’s really easier for for managers and for directors and the corporate structure to
restrict a lot of you have access to what are you not going to be able to do but it’s also at
the same time important and the employee also understands why I don’t need to have
access to that why do I need I need to know for example, right, the way the military puts
it, what I can be trusted, but I don’t have a need to know so I’m not going to share that
information with you. On a mom-and-pop shop is completely different. The small and
medium businesses. The biggest challenge is that everybody has a feels like their family
together. And that’s also the message to their lovelies mom-and-pop Strider brain, right
we’re we’re a family we’re working together, we’re a community.
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The company entrusted an employee with unlimited access to a computer system. The employee
became disgruntled over a disagreement with the owners and maliciously exploited this access
and trust.
Another factor driving insider cybersecurity threats is lack of oversight of staff access to
technology. Interviewees described situations in which employees received access to software
and programs based on their duties. One participant said this often led to employees abusing their
access “because people that are in a position to exploit those situations are often, as I referenced
earlier, the only subject matter experts in those areas.”
Insider threat activity issues also arise when an employee changes jobs within an
organization, at which point the IT department updates their permissions. Those updating the
permissions typically grant the new permissions without extensively reviewing associated
permissions to determine whether the employee still needs all permissions. One interviewee said:
Or, or what their, what their level of access is. So let’s see. Yeah, probably just kind of
verifying, verifying access levels is important and ensuring that people don’t have access
beyond what is required them for their their job position.
This permission creep inadvertently enables an employee to access software and data associated
with their former role and possibly even earlier roles. Interviewees spoke of employees
maliciously exploiting this vulnerability for personal gain. Several participants discussed access,
and the corresponding code appeared 57 times, indicating that access is a major factor in insider
threat activities.
An issue related to permission creep is that of employees receiving permissions allowing
them access to software unrelated to their duties. Interviewees spoke of employees in this
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situation exploring software and data “because they had access.” This insider threat activity is
often not malicious and is instead the result of curiosity on the part of employees.
Theme 5: Leaders Strongly Influence an Organization’s Cybersecurity Culture
Data from the interviewees indicated that an organization’s leaders have an
overwhelming influence on the organization’s security culture. Coding revealed that this
influence occurred in the context of both drivers and solutions, and Theme 5 was thus the only
theme with both negative and positive codes. Interviewees discussed how leaders failed to lead
by example or take action against employees. Participants also indicated that leaders formed a
key ingredient in the reduction of cybersecurity incidents. The 67 codes associated with Theme 5
in the organizational subcategory of the drivers category included the following:
•

environment

•

guidance (lack of)

•

leadership

•

location

•

not prosecuted

•

organizational size

•

organizational structure

•

culture

•

definition

•

training deficient

The 26 codes associated with the theme in the culture subcategory of the solutions category
included the following:
•

active management
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•

celebrate wins

•

culture

•

do the right thing

•

insider identification

•

leadership

•

mental manipulation

•

organizational structure

•

shared responsibility

•

treat people with dignity

•

trust

•

written policy

Codes in the organizational subcategory of the drivers category accounted for 31% of the codes
in the drivers category. Codes in the culture subcategory of the solutions category accounted for
42% of codes in the solutions category.
Interviewees indicated that organizational leaders negatively impacted their
organizations’ cybersecurity postures by failing to set positive examples. One participant
described a situation in which an executive in health care company did not prioritize
cybersecurity, was not diligent about cyber hygiene, and thus promoted a company culture of lax
cybersecurity. This, in turn, led to insider threat activities.
Another interviewee, who worked closely with the U.S. military, explained that he
witnessed a situation in which high-ranking general officers knowingly circumvented
cybersecurity protocols because of convenience. The circumvention involved disregarding
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security practices by preventing security patches being installed on computer systems. The
interviewee described
an unnamed well known general that said, “Hey, I don’t like my system rebooting
because I just leave all my stuff open and then I lose, like I’m writing a letter in Word or
something and then I go home I don’t say it and I don’t close everything then my system
reboots and I lose it the next day and I have to start my work over again.” So, they
created a does not get … but they used to know you that they put the general [military
officer] in, and then he told his general friends. And then the next thing you know, all the
generals, which I would say are top targets of attacks, are in a group that is clearly
labeled “do not install patches,” and they weren’t getting any patches.
He also explained that violations had occurred when an executive ordered an IT administrator to
install software. The issue worsened when other executives found out about the action and
wanted the same change made to their computer systems. The interviewee stated that the leaders
set a poor example and that this led to subordinates circumventing security controls as well.
An organization’s leaders have a direct effect on the organization through the creation
and adjustment of the organization’s structure. One participant spoke of organizations structuring
positions without understanding the possible effects on insider threat activities. He explained that
he had seen companies assign employees multiple roles. The multiple roles were associated with
responsibilities that required access to more computer systems and software than would be
typical for an employee. Employees would receive such access without the proper cybersecurity
oversight needed to verify the employees’ combined access and associated risks. Another
interviewee told of an insider threat incident that occurred when company leaders failed to
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monitor an employee’s actions after allowing the employee access to the entire IT enterprise.
The employee created multiple burner accounts and began stealing proprietary data.
The data also indicated that leaders affect both malicious and nonmalicious insider threat
employee actions. One interviewee recalled a situation in which leaders’ management actions
directly contributed to the disillusionment of an employee. The company had neglected to pay
salary owed to the employee. The employee informed the company multiple times of the error.
The employee then began to act unprofessionally and disrespectfully toward coworkers.
Company leaders feared the situation would result in a cyberspace insider threat incident. The
leaders terminated the employee and revoked the employee’s credentials before any malicious
action could occur. The interviewee said other employees were aware of the situation and closely
monitored how leaders affected their coworker’s possible intent to commit an insider threat
action.
An organization’s leaders can make a positive impact on the cybersecurity culture of an
organization regarding solutions for reducing cyberspace insider threat activities. One participant
said his company’s executives showed respect for cybersecurity through their actions. The
participant recounted some of his experiences:
If, if someone could say, “Oh well we can’t we can’t make this inconvenient for the
senior leadership,” it doesn’t have to be a demo it can be a CEO the financial office
doesn’t like having to restart their system so we don’t patch the financial audits like but
that’s where all the attackers are going they’re going over here where you’re not patching
their systems and they can just move willy-nilly through the environment because you
don’t have the same security standards.
He believed this affected the views on cybersecurity of all those in organization.
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The data indicated that leaders of an organization have a direct impact on organizational
security culture. One interviewee believed this culture begins with leaders and how much their
actions reflect caring about cybersecurity. Showing the necessary support can be as simple as a
leader consulting their cybersecurity teams before making decisions that deal with technology:
And then just expediency, right? There’s a big push to like automated tests, or something
like that. And you have to roll it out now, because it’s going to increase our efficiency,
we paid all this money for it. So just employ it. And it’s, you know, the nature of the
business, you keep wanting to move faster, get ahead, keep that competitive advantage.
And so that trickles down from leadership to to I think those implementers and if they
don’t consult the security group, or even if they even if they do, you know, they may say
okay, well, we got to install this as is and somebody goes around, goes over the the
governance policy and the need to actually implement that the right way with proper
controls.
The data indicated that an organization’s leaders affect organizational security culture by
caring, or not caring, about education and training. One respondent told of his experiences in this
regard:
I firmly believe [issues with security culture] can be resolved through proper education
and proper training for the organization, stressing that cybersecurity importance, coming
from the top leadership of the organization, so that every individual inside the org knows
that from the top down, it’s, it’s serious. It’s a matter not to be taken in light is the one of
the main driving policies of the organization so proper education, and definitely proper
senior leader support in a cyber program will make it successful. In combating insider
threat.
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One interviewee said that he believed one important solution relates to how leaders react
and treat an employee they suspect of committing an insider threat action. He believed
employers should not assume the action has been committed with malicious intentions. He
described a situation in which a suspected cyber infraction had occurred:
It set off the alarms and myself and our chief privacy officer were immediately involved
and began our investigation. And what had happened and the assumptions of this
unwilling individual were first, it was assumed that it was intentional. And this person
who was, was trying to exfil data patient data from the organization network, you know,
but making contact with the individual. It was quickly ascertained that it was a mistake.
Now, my, my issue. My main issue with this is, you know, in summary, was a mistake.
The person clicked on the wrong thing. Our technology that we have in place to alert us
on these things worked like a charm. But the problem I had was the assumption that the,
the unwilling user was definitely 100 percent malicious, and they were engaged in, you
know, criminal behavior, which was far from the case. So the main problem I have is, is
assuming things it was any a willing or unwilling issue or incident, there should never be
a quick judge, or assumption to the costs. That’s the, that’s the weak point we have in our
insider threat, overall, is the quick rush to judgment without ascertaining the facts.
The data indicated that a leader must calmly gather facts while discussing an incident with an
accused employee. This allows the leader to uncover the intention behind the incident while also
building rapport with the employee. The tactic also allows the leader to determine whether the
action was malicious or not. Reserving judgment also shows other employees that hiding
cybersecurity breaches from leaders is unnecessary. For instance, the interviewee had witnessed
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firsthand the positive reactions of employees when leaders showed a caring attitude rather than a
vengeful one.
Theme 6: Education Improves Cyber Awareness and Reduces Cyber Incidents
Education and training solutions described by interviewees mostly related to benign
cybersecurity infractions. This high proportion of data related to benign education and training
solutions correlated with the high proportion of unwitting incidents discussed by interviewees as
driving cyberspace insider threat activities. The data did indicate that real-life scenario-based
education and training improve cyber awareness and reduces cyber incidents. The education and
training subcategory of the solutions category corresponded to Theme 6. There were 11 codes for
this theme, including:
•

awareness

•

education

•

phishing exercises

•

training

•

unique ideas

Codes from this theme accounted for 17% of the codes for the solutions category.
Interviewees indicated that coursework mimicking cybersecurity situations that new
employees might encounter could improve insider threat education and training. Multiple
interviewees noted that existing training programs lacked practicality and did not relate to what
employees would likely encounter. One responded said, “They clicked on a link that was
designed to install malware, and that through through the retraining and everything, once again,
you know, that was that was one of the primary primary issues are primary social engineering
tests.” He believed training at that particular company did not focus on the social engineering
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aspect. Another interviewee echoed this thought and explained that he believed phishing training
programs must be as current and realistic as possible. He spoke of education and training
programs that were never adjusted and lacked updated training products.
Participants often discussed awareness. One participant spoke of the need to develop
training that improves awareness. The data suggest that education and training programs would
improve awareness. One interviewee said that insider threat training was often stale and rarely
updated. Another interviewee said he had seen reductions in insider threat incidents in companies
that developed training and kept it different and fresh: “Like gotten gear getting you, and it keeps
refreshing people’s interaction, because everybody, you know, will kind of scoff and look at the
online training, or whatever, it’s always the same, maybe it changes a little bit.” Employees
rarely embraced existing company training, which led employees to view cybersecurity
education and training as tiresome. He said the solution was to provide education and training
that are both captivating and interesting. Companies administering such training had more
success reducing cybersecurity incidents than other companies.
An interviewee said he believed companies could reduce employee unwitting cyber
incidents by adjusting remedial cyber education and training policies. He added that companies
should align remedial training with cyber infractions. He believed the problem lay with existing
remedial training directives that required employees to complete education and training
regardless of their infractions. He described the solutions he had seen that produced positive
outcomes:
The only way we’re able to do this is by increasing, either. We call them desktop
simulations or by increasing our awareness and training and simulation phishing
campaigns to try to identify, you know, more and more what do our people, what is their
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behavior, you know the people that we have and in order we need to do to make sure, you
know, to, to, to mitigate the risk as much as possible.
Another interviewee said he had witnessed employees having to complete 1 hr (or more) of
training for making a mistake. The training was often superficial, and employees typically
finished the course feeling that they had been punished for making a mistake.
Theme 7: Aligning Technology With Employee Job Functions
There is a need for company technology developed and implemented according to the
role of each employee. Most of the cyber incidents discussed by interviewees were the result of
witting employees with benign intentions. Most of these incidents stemmed from employees who
believed they had to circumvent organizational cybersecurity policies to accomplish job tasks.
The data indicated that successful technological solutions align technology with employee job
functions. The technological subcategory of the solutions category corresponded to Theme 7.
There were 16 codes for this theme, including the following:
•

access control

•

mitigation

•

security monitoring

•

technical controls

•

technology fit people

•

technology funding

•

vetting

Codes from this theme accounted for 25% of the codes for the solutions category.
Employees will circumvent a technological solution if they do not agree with the solution
or if their job function does not align with the solution. For example, in one health care setting,
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workers left their workstations unattended without properly locking them. The workers
committed these cyber infractions to provide care to patients. In response, the company
developed common access cards for the health care workers that allowed them to lock the
workstations and use their common access cards to log back on to the workstations. One of the
interviewees explained the process they used to align technology with the health care workers
job functions:
So you know we go to great lengths to to use technologies that that you know will use.
You know that will move away from keystrokes for example, so can we, can we use a
badge tap system to where they, they log in first thing in the day, and the rest of the day
they just have a badge and get into their session with with Epic, you know our electronic
health record.
Nurses were not the only health care workers who required technological solutions
aligned with their job functions. Several of the cybersecurity participants who worked in the
health care industry said medical doctors also committed cyber infractions if technology was
unfit for their purposes. He explained how some doctors use personal, outdated, and
unauthorized email services. Other doctors used unauthorized software, hardware, or cloudbased services. The participant said:
As far as the, the time that it takes to gain access to a system, or to gain access to
whatever it is they need to be able to, to do their job so that’s really when I talk about
security can get in the way it can be something as simple as a username and password,
get in the way of them being able to perform the job and they want to be able to do that to
perform it, so.
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These medical professionals used the aforementioned services despite having access to secure
and authorized IT solutions. This participant’s company discovered the doctors committed these
benign infractions because they were more comfortable using the unauthorized tools than the
ones provided by the company.
One interviewee stressed the importance of multi-alignment: aligning the right role, the
right technology, and the right person. This alignment process begins with vetting of a person to
ensure they possess the right skill set for a role, including the right technological skill set. This
helps to reduce unwitting insider threat infractions that occur accidentally. The interviewee
explained: “So I’d say, yeah, both background and make sure that they they have the capability
and that they don’t, and also background, they don’t have any potential issues that could cause
problems with what they have access to.” He believed companies sometimes hire people who
possess the right knowledge but lack understanding of how to operate assigned technology.
Another health care industry interviewee expanded on his organization’s focus as it
related to assisting their employees by providing technology that aligned better with their job
functions:
You know I hear every excuse in the book that they don’t want to comply and they don’t
want to follow that new procedure, so that the challenges that I’ve faced on a weekly
basis are, you know, tweaking and adjusting workflows.
Theme 8: Effective Transparent Communication
Interviewees discussed the value of effective communication and how communication
can help reduce insider threat incidents. Respondents highlighted the importance of ensuring that
an organization’s employees feel comfortable discussing cybersecurity issues within the
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organization. The communication subcategory of the solutions category corresponded to Theme
8. There were 11 codes for this theme, including:
•

buy-in

•

discussion

•

employee feedback

•

employees part of solution

•

positive reinforcement

•

relationships

•

see and say something

•

stress cyber importance

•

understand the why

Codes for this theme accounted for 17% of the codes for the solutions category.
One participant spoke about the complex linkage between leadership, communication,
and cybersecurity. He said that leaders of an organization needed to understand how important
their communication was to the cybersecurity culture within their organization. Speaking with
conviction, he said:
But more often than not it’s just it’s due to a culture of, you know, and also the, what you
talked about earlier, about you know the the difficulty and understanding the IT sphere,
and how you need to be able to take you know complex, difficult processes and articulate
them to people not familiar, that complexity, just creates an overall ignorance of the risk
that it system poses any major organization.
One interviewee pointed to the need for employees to feel comfortable self-reporting
social engineering attacks. The interviewee said that he had spoken with employees who would
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not report that they had accidentally responded to a phishing attack. In this case, the company
had installed software to block the phishing attacks, thus ensuring the intent of a threat actor (an
employee) was thwarted by the security measure. The interviewee explained how companies
should set up and encourage self-reporting:
So I think it’s important that a program of policy not be overly punitive for users, because
if they’re afraid, too afraid of the consequences, the detrimental consequences to
reporting on our threat of self reporting, violations, then your organization misses out on
a good opportunity for lessons learned. So it’s not necessarily that the organization can’t
learn from mistakes, if people don’t self-report, but moreover, that it kind of engender a
culture of fear amongst users.
The interviewee said the employees often felt embarrassed by the situation and did not want
managers and coworkers to ridicule them. Some employees felt they had failed others by falling
for a trick.
One health care industry interviewee spoke of the importance of reacting with a positive
outlook toward guilty employees during security incidents. He recalled a situation in which those
in his hospital dealt with employees in a medical section who were actively responding to
phishing emails. The interviewee said he provided directions to the chief information security
officer, who investigated the situation; while providing the directions, the interviewee had said
multiple times that he wanted the chief information security officer to be as helpful and positive
as possible during conversations with the offenders.
Another interviewee talked about the importance of celebrating cybersecurity wins and
not just focusing on employees compromised by threat actors. The participant explained that the
leaders of most companies focused on negative cybersecurity incidents that had occurred without
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highlighting positive cybersecurity actions. He described what he had witnessed in some
companies:
But they’re trying to now and doing it a lot across private industries, is to celebrate
incidents as a win, and say you know this is the importance of looking at it because a lot
of these incidents, as you see time and time again, often occur because of the same
mistake or the same kind of habit, over and over again. So, so the more people get
exposed to it and then kind of reverse their, their view to it, then I think that it only
enforces that culture.
He provided further context by saying that most benign cyber events, in the form of phishing
attacks, had a success rate of 8%–10%. This meant companies had a success rate of preventing
phishing attacks of 90%–92%. The interviewee further explained that most companies focused
only on the phishing attack success rate while ignoring the prevention success rate; he saw this as
a missed opportunity to celebrate success.
Another interviewee spoke about the importance of establishing open communication
throughout a company when discussing cybersecurity incidents. He said a focus on negative
cyber incidents establishes a tense atmosphere in a company—a feeling that drives employees to
avoid reporting cyber infractions for fear of disappointing company leaders. He explained that
leaders should build a culture that encourages employees to report any insider threat incidents:
So, try to make them more positive than negative outcomes and I think you’ll be far more
effective and far more receptive, with your employee base and kind of speaking up across
the board. This includes self-reporting as well as reporting malicious insider threat
activities committed by other leaders and coworkers.
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The data indicated that transparent communication also entails informing employees of
future technological changes. One interviewee spoke of how providing a clear, detailed message
helps employees embrace an upcoming change:
Yes because changes to the environment are both communicated via, via several avenues.
We have a change control every week where changes like this are announced. We also
have communications that sent out via email to the organization that informs individuals
of things like this. The change was communicated out very clearly. But then again, you
know, not everybody reads what they receive, and there’s a big surprise when the action
is taken.
Interviewees also said that one way to improve company communication structures is to
adjust punishment procedures and policies to take into account employee self-reporting of cyber
infractions. One interviewee said he had dealt with phishing attack situations in which employees
did not self-report because they feared consequences, even though the cyber infractions were
benign. The interviewee believed the employees would have self-reported incidents if they were
subject to an amnesty instead of harsh punishments.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Overview
The focus of the study was extraction of data related answering the research questions.
RQ1 asked: What are the cultural, technological, and individual factors that drive and enable
cyberspace insider threats? RQ2 asked: What are solutions that reduce cyberspace insider
threats? The study relied on a thematic analysis framework to identify themes related to the
aforementioned research questions. Figure 14 summarizes the results of the analysis.

Figure 14. Crosswalk of data to themes and factors.
In this qualitative analysis study, I focused on identifying themes and factors that drive
insider threat activities and solutions that reduce those activities. Interviews were conducted with
15 cybersecurity subject matter experts from three industries: government, health care, and
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cybersecurity. These three industries were chosen based on oversight, social engineering
(ransomware) attacks experienced, and expertise.
This chapter provides analysis of the findings from Chapter 4. The findings suggest
organizational (cultural), technological, and individual factors that drive and enable cyberspace
insider threat activities. Within the category of drivers, organizational, technological, and
individual subcategories emerged. The individual factors identified are awareness, caring,
devotion, and selfishness. The individual factors align with types of employee insider threat
actions: awareness links with unwitting–unmalicious (UW–UM) actions, caring and devotion
lings with witting–unmalicious (W–UM) actions, and selfishness connects with witting–
malicious (W–M) actions. The technological factor identified is access, and the organizational
(cultural) factor identified is leadership. Coding of the interview data indicated that
“organizational” was a more precise label than “cultural” for the organizational subcategory,
which corresponds to organization-based factors that drive an individual to insider threat
activities.
The findings suggest multiple solutions that can reduce cyberspace insider threats. Four
subcategories emerged within the solutions category: culture, education and training, technology,
and communication. The findings suggest that leadership is an important solution factor within
the culture subcategory. The findings also suggest a need for companies to provide education and
training that are both advantageous and felicitous. The findings indicate that alignment is the
most important solution factor within the technology subcategory. I also identified
communication-related solutions that involved the factor of transparency between sender and
receiver. Figure 15 summarizes the relationships among the categories, subcategories, and
factors.
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Figure 15. Relationships among categories, subcategories, and factors.
I identified 12 employee psychosocial risk factors when reviewing existing literature in
the initial stages of the study. These risk factors serve as early warning indicators that employees
are considering cyberspace insider threat crimes (Greitzer & Frincke, 2010). The findings
confirm 10 of these 12 psychosocial risk factors. Figure 16 highlights the confirmed factors.
I identified 10 driver and solution factors. The factors I identified supported 10 of the 12
psychosocial factors identified by Greitzer and Frincke (2010) in their model. Some factors from
my study align with their model, others do not. I focused on cultural and technological factors in
addition to individual factors. I also considered solutions as well as drivers.
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Figure 16. Drivers and solutions identified in the study. On the left, factors identified during the
study that drive cyberspace insider threat activities and contribute to solutions. On the right,
factors identified by Greitzer and Frincke (2010), with factors confirmed by my findings shaded.
My first research objective was identification of cultural, technological, and individual
factors that drive and enable cyberspace insider threats. The individual driver factors I identified
are awareness, caring, devotion, and selfishness. I also identified technological access and
organizational (cultural) leadership as driver factors. My second research objective was
identification of solutions to reduce cyberspace insider threats. I identified leadership in culture,
transparency in communication, alignment of technology, and advantageous and felicitous
education and training programs as solutions factors.
Insider Threat Incident Type Adjustment
I identified four distinct factors that drive an employee to insider threat activity:
awareness, caring, devotion, and selfishness. High levels of selfishness and low levels of the
other factors lead to insider threat actions. Incidents involving these factors are directly linked to
three types of insider threat incident: awareness is linked to UW–UM incidents, caring and
devotion are linked to W–UM incidents, and selfishness is linked to W–M incidents. My
interviewees did not discuss insider threat actions that were unwitting–malicious (UW–M). This
fourth incident type was therefore not linked to any factors. Figure 17 summarizes the individual
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insider threat incident types. Figure 18 summarizes the links between these incident types and
the factors identified.

Figure 17. Cyberspace insider threat incident types. UW–UM = unwitting–unmalicious; UW–
M = unwitting–malicious; W–UM = witting–unmalicious; W–M = witting–malicious.

76

Figure 18. Cyberspace insider threat incident types and individual factors.
Thematic Interpretation
Theme 1: Employees Lacking Foundational Technological Knowledge Unwittingly Commit
Cyber Contraventions
Summary of Findings. Interviewees described the execution of some insider threat
activities by employees who did not realize they were committing cybersecurity violations. A
majority of these actions occurred because employees lacked technical knowledge related to the
software and systems used. Awareness is the most important factor associated with this theme.
Interpretation of Findings. Employees who commit UW–UM cyberspace infractions do
so because they lack the technical knowledge needed to execute their job-related duties. This can
occur with employees new to a company and also with employees who lack experience because
they are using a newly installed IT system. Lack of technical knowledge drives lack of
77

awareness. An employee is unaware they are committing a cyber infraction, because they lack
the technical knowledge needed to understand what they are doing. Employees who lack
awareness are most likely to commit cyber insider threat actions falling into the UW–UM
category. Employees who lack necessary technical training and education related to their job
functions are a continuous and constant insider threat risk. Company leaders must understand the
need for proper continuous technical training and education to give employees the technical
knowledge needed to understand how not to commit cybersecurity infractions.
Theme 2: Employees Sometimes Commit Cyber Infractions in the Belief No Harm Will Come
to Others
Summary of Findings. The codes associated with this theme were the codes most
discussed by the interviewees. Interviewees discussed W–UM insider threat actions more than
UW–UM and W–M actions. These actions were discussed most by health care cybersecurity
participants. Most of the provided examples involved doctors, medical professionals, and other
health care employees who had no malicious intent when engaging in insider threat activities.
According to the data, caring and devotion (and also lack of caring and devotion) are the drivers
that enable cyberspace insider threat activities.
Interpretation of Findings. Most employees want to do their jobs but sometimes are
unfortunately forced to choose between following a cybersecurity policy and completing their
job responsibilities. Insider threat cybersecurity actions of this kind are W–UM; an employee
consciously chooses an action but does not intend to harm others with their action. Health care
industry workers provide the best examples of this situation. Employees often commit W–UM
insider threat infractions if placed in a position where they cannot succeed.
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Most employees will commit insider threat infractions when faced with an ethical
dilemma in which the insider threat infraction is the lesser of two evils. This is even more likely
if an employee has to choose between providing care to a human being and following a
cybersecurity protocol. The caring and devotion factors are clear in the example of a health care
professional. Caring and devotion drive a worker to provide care to a patient, even when the
worker knows they are a witting participant in a cyberspace infraction. Too much caring and
devotion can lead to insider threat infractions. Lack of caring and devotion can also lead to
infractions. Employees who disregard cybersecurity protocols or lack the devotion needed to
adhere to company cybersecurity policies are examples of this process.
Theme 3: Selfishness Becomes the Dominant Behavioral Factor When Employees Commit
Malicious Cybercrimes
Summary of Findings. The interviewees provided great feedback pertaining to Theme 3.
The theme encompasses insider threat terms such as “embezzlement,” “revenge,”
“disgruntlement,” “personal gain,” and “ego” provided by the interviewees. These terms
characterize W–M incidents, which occur when employees knowingly perform actions intended
to harm others. According to the data, selfishness is the driving factor for employees who
commit these cyberspace crimes.
Interpretation of Findings. Employees who commit U–M cybercrimes do so while
displaying traits of selfishness. These employees focus on the greatest good for themselves.
Identification and prediction of insider threat activities involving selfishness can be difficult
because of the complexity surrounding employees. Employees with malicious intentions often
hide those intentions. An example of this behavior is when employees embezzle proprietary data
using IT systems. Employees sometimes wait for an opportune time to steal company money or
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data. The W–M actions are hard to identify and can also be devasting if employees are set on
destruction of property. Employees often plan these types of actions in advance; they are rarely
spur of the moment occurrences.
Understanding why malicious insider attacks occur is paramount for prevention.
According to Rid and Buchanan (2015), “understanding the rationale of an intrusion is hard but
crucial. Knowing an adversary’s motivation and behavior makes mitigating future breaches
easier” (p. 25).
Theme 4: Well-Intended Technological Control Measures Sometimes Prompt End Users to
Exploit IT Systems
Summary of Findings. Interviewees provided data indicating that employees exploited
company systems and networks because of improper access control adjustment and security
protocol implementation. Interviewees gave examples of employees using networks and IT
systems because IT administrators had errantly granted the employees access to those networks
and systems. The data suggests that employees access unauthorized computers for malicious and
nonmalicious reasons.
Researchers have touched on this theme by explaining that employees sometimes use
valid access to commit insider threat activities. Coles-Kemp and Theoharidou (2010) explained
how an employee can progress relatively quickly throughout a network and the importance of
understanding employee behavior:
By virtue of being within the perimeter, the insider has knowledge of the internal
environment. If the insider is authorized to be within that perimeter, then there is a
likelihood that further authorized access to information has been granted and that the
individual is expected, and possibly trusted, to behave in a certain way. Motivation is
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critical in determining whether the individual chooses to comply with the expected
behavior. (p. 48).
Interpretation of Findings. Some companies’ IT architectures include well-intended
cybersecurity-focused measures. Employees sometimes use vulnerabilities associated with
company IT architectures to access cyber systems and data. Employees use access or gaps in
access restrictions to do this. This is why I identified the access factor as the most pertinent
factor related to IT systems. Insider threats always require opportunity and means (along with
motivation), which both involve access to systems. IT administrators often do not take the time
to verify whether employees should have the access they have. The administrators errantly
provide admission to an employee by providing them with access. Employees sometimes take
advantage of this errantly granted access to reconnoiter networks or IT systems.
Theme 5: Leaders Strongly Influence an Organization’s Cybersecurity Culture
Summary of Findings. The data indicated that leaders of an organization continue to
have a crucial effect on organizational cybersecurity posture. Interviewees spoke of leaders in
positive and negative terms. The examples provided showed that some leaders care about their
subordinates and others perform inconsiderate actions. Some interviewees gave accounts of
leaders who had continuous interactive cybersecurity communications with subordinates. These
leaders seemed to understand the importance of positive, established relationships to getting
employees to buy in to organizational cybersecurity programs. Some interviewees believed
getting employees to buy in is an important step in reducing insider threat activities. Participants
described leaders who set the standards in their organizations by leading with good examples.
However, participants also described leaders who displayed traits that were questionable at best.
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Some leaders were extremely active in their organizations’ cybersecurity programs, and
others were not. The data also indicated that negative treatment of employees can spawn insider
threat activity. Interviewees emphasized the importance of positive leader–employee interactions
and how these interactions help stave off insider threat incidents.
Findings reported in existing literature support the use of supervisory involvement to
mitigate insider threat activities. Greitzer and Frincke (2010) called for supervisors to be
involved and intervene when possible, which the authors said could lead to “counseling,
involvement with support groups, and medical assistance” (p. 108). The authors also posited that
it is “essential, however, that those who might intervene recognize and respond to significant
warning signs and symptoms” (Greitzer & Frincke, 2010, p. 108).
Interpretation of Findings. Leadership is one of the most important factors in the
insider threat equation. The importance of this factor is second only to that of the individual
employee. Leadership greatly affects the level of organizational cyberspace insider threat
activity. One of the ways leaders affect insider threat activity is through development and
implementation of cybersecurity policies and protocols. Nebulous guidance leads to employee
misunderstandings of cybersecurity programs. Incorrect guidance does the same. However,
leaders who provide cybersecurity guidance that is clear and cogent improve the increased
effectiveness of insider threat remediation programs.
Actions of company leaders are crucial to increasing or decreasing the level of insider
threat activities within a company. Leaders sometimes set a positive example by making prudent
cybersecurity decisions. At other times, leaders display traits that negatively affect company
security programs. Employees observe leaders’ actions and mimic those actions. There is a direct
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correlation between the positivity of actions displayed and the level of insider threat incidents.
Positive displays of leadership reduce insider threat activity.
Leader–employee interaction is another crucial part of combatting cyberspace insider
threat activities. Leaders who attend in a positive way to employees reduce insider threat
activities. Employees treated with less than the required care by their leaders are more likely than
other employees to turn their anger toward those leaders in the form of insider threat incidents.
Theme 6: Real-Life, Scenario-Based Education and Training Improve Cyber Awareness and
Reduce Cyber Incidents
Summary of Findings. Interviewees said that education and training are crucial to
improving employee mindfulness as part of reducing cyber insider threat activities. This theme
emerged often in the coded data. Participants provided examples of the type of education and
training needed and background on why these two areas were required. Interviewees said that
archaic training materials in use did not reflect scenarios employees were experiencing.
Participants pointed to employees routinely committing unwitting insider threat infractions
because outdated training failed to address current threat actor operational tactics.
Two main factors related to education and training solutions emerged from the data:
Interviewees indicated that training needs to be both advantageous and felicitous. Interviewees
spoke of the need for companies to deliver both training that generates conditions favorable for
success and cybersecurity training that is chosen based on cybersecurity trends and tailored to the
needs of the companies.
Interviewees also spoke of solutions that can help reduce insider threat activities. One of
these solutions involves education and training that is fresh and different. One interviewee
explained that employees were more likely to put into practice training that was interesting and
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contained relevant information. The data also indicated a need for remedial training aligned with
cybersecurity infractions; leaders should avoid prescribing one training for every kind of
infraction.
Interpretation of Findings. Companies often rely on education and training as ways to
reduce cyberspace insider threat activities. However, the implementation of education and
training within most companies lacks required characteristics. When leaders implement training
correctly, employees become more aware of their IT environment and workstations. They gain a
better understanding of the capabilities of their environment, which helps them understand
environmental limitations and how not to commit infractions. Education and training also benefit
employees because they allow employees to learn the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures—
both those used by threat actors and those used to combat threat actors. This insight enables
employee to gain a deeper understanding the actions recommended when dealing with threat
actors. This in turn enables employees to guess less when encountering possible cyberspace
intrusions.
Correctly developed and administered education and training also benefit employees
because they provide definitions of what constitutes an insider threat and insider threat
infractions. Employees become more aware of cybersecurity insider threats. This saves
employees, who might have lacked this knowledge, from accidentally performing cybersecurity
insider threat activities. Education and training further reduce cybersecurity insider threat
activities because those with the potential to perform UW–UM cybersecurity insider threat
activities become aware of the cybersecurity policies and restrictions implemented by their
organizations. Education and training also reduce cybersecurity insider threats in the UW–UM
category by making employees understand and more aware of how to not commit cybersecurity
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insider threat infractions. Employees gain better understanding of what an insider threat activity
looks like and the steps to take if faced with these types of activities.
The findings also suggest that education and training are important within a company for
showing the importance of cybersecurity. Training that is both advantageous and felicitous tends
to reinforce to a company’s employees the company’s commitment to cybersecurity. This leads
to a reduction in insider threat activities because employees mimic this care for IT systems and
infrastructures. Companies also benefit from advantageous and felicitous education and training
because their employees gain increased technical efficiency, which reduces insider threat
activities.
In addition to the need for training that is tailored and advantageous, Greitzer, Strozer, et
al. (2014) posited the need to ensure staff members responsible for conducting training are
themselves properly trained:
Organizations should develop and deploy effective staff training and awareness programs
aimed at educating users about social engineering scams, including learning objectives to
help staff attend to phishing cues, identify deceptive practices, and recognize suspicious
patterns of social engineering exploits. (p. 248)
Training trainers also provides leaders with opportunities to evaluate organizational training
programs.
Theme 7: Successful Technological Solutions Align Technology With Employee Job
Functions
Summary of Findings. Alignment of technological solutions and job functions in the
context of cyberspace insider threat activities did not emerge during the review of existing
literature. Interviewees addressed this theme directly and indirectly. They also provided multiple
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real-world examples of the importance of aligning technological systems with employee job
functions.
Interpretation of Findings. Technology is the backbone of knowledge transmission that
spans every industry. The introduction of technology often fails to take into account employee
job functions, cybersecurity risks, or insider threat activities. Leaders of a company must take the
difficult and time-consuming step of determining the best IT systems for each employee job
function. Although taking this step is financially taxing on the front end, it will save a company
money on the back end by reducing the costs of responding to insider threat incidents. Aligning
solutions and job functions encourages employees to follow established cybersecurity policies
because they feel their leaders understand their roles well and have provided the IT systems they
need to succeed in those roles. Analysis of this alignment must include employees with each job
function within a company to ensure deep understanding of job functions. Leaders should not
assume they understand job functions; such assumptions will lead them to waste money on IT
systems that do not fully support employees’ job functions.
Theme 8: Transparent Communication Effectiveness Determines an Organization’s
Cybersecurity Posture
Summary of Findings. The findings indicate the importance of communication as a
solution for reducing cybersecurity insider threat activities. Interviewees described leaders as the
most important agents in the establishment of transparent communication. The participants also
indicated that leaders who establish caring communication can reduce W–M cybersecurity
insider threats. Interviewees said employers need to establish security culture conditions in
which employees feel comfortable self-reporting UW–UM and W–UM cybersecurity insider
threats. One interviewee spoke of companies going even creating amnesty programs to
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encourage employees to report cybersecurity insider threats. According to the interviewees,
transparent communication enables ongoing, open discussions about cybersecurity in general.
One interviewee emphasized the importance of including celebrations of company cybersecurity
wins as part of this open communication. The same interviewee pointed out that establishing
transparent communication also encourages employees to actively report the potential
cybersecurity insider threat activities of fellow coworkers.
Interpretation of Findings. Transparent communication is needed for short- and longterm success in any cybersecurity insider threat program. The findings indicate that leaders are
the most important agents in the establishment of transparent communication. Leaders are the
driving force behind establishing effective communication with their subordinates. Transparent
communication provides many benefits and is a main solution for combatting insider threat
activities.
Transparent communication by leaders shows employees that managers care enough to
listen to their needs, which reduces W–M cybersecurity insider threats. Increasing transparent
communication also allows leaders to establish better rapport with their employees. This rapport
allows leaders to identify potential insider threat issues and employees considering W–T
cybersecurity insider threat activities. This improved rapport also allows employees to feel more
comfortable about self-reporting UW–UM and W–UM infractions. Company leaders who
establish positive transparent communication when dealing with cybersecurity can then establish
viable amnesty programs to encourage employees to report cybersecurity insider threats.
Transparent communication also provides employees the comfort needed to report potential
insider threat activities of coworkers.
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Conclusions
Insider threat activities within cyberspace include more than just the commonly known
types of incidents, such as embezzlement and destruction. Cybersecurity subject matter experts
who participated in this study told me that a large majority of insider threat activities consist of
employees committing UW–UM and W–UM infractions.
RQ1 asked: What are the cultural, technological, and individual factors that drive and
enable cyberspace insider threats? Interviewee data was used develop codes, followed by
categories. The categories driven by the research questions were individual, technological, and
organizational. Thematic analysis of these categories led to the creation of five themes:
employees lacking foundational technological knowledge unwittingly commit cyber
contraventions, employees sometimes commit cyber infractions in the belief no harm will come
to others, selfishness becomes the dominant behavioral factor when employees commit malicious
cybercrimes, well-intended technological control measures sometimes prompt end users to
exploit IT systems, and leaders strongly influence compliance with an organization’s
cybersecurity culture. The themes allowed for the identification of factors that drive insider
threat activities. The individual, technological, and organizational (cultural) factors identified as
drivers of insider threat activities were awareness, caring, devotion, selfishness, access, and
leadership.
RQ2 focused on identification of solutions to the cyberspace insider threat problem: What
are solutions that decrease cyberspace insider threats? Four themes emerged in relation to
solutions: leaders strongly influence compliance with an organization’s cybersecurity culture,
real-life, scenario-based education and training improve cyber awareness and reduce cyber
incidents, successful technological solutions align technology with employee job functions, and
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transparent communication effectiveness determines an organization’s cybersecurity posture.
Solution factors identified were leadership, advantageous, felicitous, alignment, and
transparency.
The findings indicate the importance of understanding employees as insider threats as
well as factors that drive employees to perform cybersecurity insider threat activities. Company
leaders must understand these factors and how individual, technological, and organizational
factors contribute to the insider threat landscape. Company leaders must also understand and
properly define the different types of insider threat infractions: UW–UM, W–UM, and W–M.
Cybersecurity programs must be developed that incorporate solutions that are specific to
particular incident types. The solutions must include technological solutions that allow proper
access and access controls for employees.
Company leaders must also comprehend the positive and negative effects leaders have on
potential insider threats. Leaders must understand the organizational and culture factor and create
solutions to maximize leader–employee involvement. This includes solutions that start with
security-focused technology and take into account specific employee roles. Company leaders
must also develop education and training programs that align closely with how insider threat
activities occur and what employees can expect to see. A focus on the development of education
and training that are advantageous and felicitous can ensure that provided scenarios are as true to
life as possible. Solutions also must involve development of transparent communication
programs. The communication focus must be on developing leader–employee rapport that shows
commitment and caring are important to company leaders.
In Chapter 2, I identified five main themes within existing literature, which also indicated
gaps in research that provided opportunities for investigation. The five themes were insider threat
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key contributing factors, identification of insider threat activities, reducing and defending against
insider threat activities, building organizational security programs and training programs, and
defining insider threats. The findings of this study help fill the gaps in existing research by
clearly delineating themes and factors that drive individuals to perform insider threat activities.
These factors relate to the individuals themselves, technology within their organizations, and the
organizations themselves. The findings also improve understanding of solutions to the insider
threat problem through identification of solutions and their key contributing factors.
Contribution to Academics and Practitioners
This study helps academics on more than one front. The findings provide academics with
a better understanding of what industry cybersecurity practitioners have been observing with
regard to insider threat activities. The findings also identify more factors related to insider threat
actors. Knowledge of these factors provides clear insight into what drives insiders performing
these actions. The findings also provide academics with solutions for combatting cyberspace
insider threats. These solutions derive from the insights of industry practitioners who constantly
battle insiders.
My findings provide academic researchers with more insight into how human beings
interact with technology. The findings also provide more insight into how motivations affect
employee actions when using computer systems. This information could aid development of
better constructs focused on improving human-technological interactions. The findings also
establish the importance of aligning technological solutions with employee job functions. This
knowledge could aid development of procedures or models for ensuring employees have the
proper technology needed for their job functions.
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The findings also improve understanding of the importance of leaders in establishing
viable cybersecurity programs, including the overall influence leaders wield in guiding an
organization’s culture, either intentionally or unintentionally. This insight could aid construction
of programs to develop and train leaders and—more importantly—improve leader awareness.
The study also provides many contributions to practice. The study’s focus on individual,
technological, and organizational factors is novel. This approach offers enterprise cybersecurity
systems managers and developers opportunities to build more capable systems. The framework
can inform the design of assessment of, monitoring of, and responses to human-factor-based
cybersecurity breaches. For example, those responsible for detecting and responding to threats
might identify and mitigate a breach based on a causal external factor, such as culture, very
differently to the way they identify and mitigate a breach with an individual cause, such as
disgruntlement.
Limitations and Future Research
A multitude of limitations affected this study. The first and most important limitation was
lack of access to insider threat actors. Based on the nature of the subject and the limited time
available for the study, gaining such access seemed infeasible. I was unable to locate a viable
directory of individuals who fell into the insider threat category.
The second limitation was lack of access to large cybersecurity companies and large
companies in general. Those working in most such companies were unwilling to discuss insider
threat activities or provide related data because they were concerned with public perceptions if
information related to insider threat actions became public knowledge. Representatives of these
companies were also concerned about increased public knowledge of their cybersecurity
architectures and processes.
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The third limitation was lack of access to celebrated insider threat experts. I attempted to
contact a multitude of people who possessed extensive experience in this domain as well as
renowned authors, most of whom did not respond to requests via social media, such as LinkedIn.
It was difficult to acquire the contact details of executive leader due to fears of sweeping social
engineering attacks.
The fourth limitation was the degree of transparency provided by interviewed
cybersecurity practitioners. These experts were extremely knowledgeable, helpful, and
committed to providing assistance when needed for the health of the study. The problem related
to the specifics provided for some responses. The interviewees sometimes failed to provide
specifics, citing nondisclosure agreements they were party to.
The findings suggest many avenues for future research. The framework offers a fresh,
innovative view of the position of behavioral control as a means of understanding and addressing
risk in the human-factors-centered cybersecurity landscape. Additional research taking this
insight into account is appropriate on both the policy and the programming fronts. Enterprise
cybersecurity policy management and insider training could benefit significantly from a clear
understanding of, and focus on, whether enterprises, individuals, or both are loci of risk in the
human factors associated with breaches. Cybersecurity learning algorithms and the development
of artificial intelligence based on machine learning must take into account the loci of insider
human factors to both learn more intelligently and to improve detection of breaches. I
recommend further research into the development of viable applications, which would benefit
significantly from this insight and use of the identified themes.
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Appendix A: Verbal Consent Form
Script for Obtaining Verbal Informed Consent
Information to Consider Before Taking Part in this Research Study
Title: Identification of Factors That Drive Cyberspace Insider Threats
Study # 001991

Overview:
You are being asked to take part in a research study. The information in this document should
help you to decide if you would like to participate. The sections in this overview provide the
necessary information about the study. More detailed information is provided in the remainder of
the document.
Study Staff: This study is being led by Marcus Green, who is a doctoral candidate in the Muma
College of Business Doctor of Business Administration program. This person is called the
Principal Investigator. He is being guided in this research by Eric Eisenberg, Ph.D., and Priya
Dozier, D.B.A. Other approved research staff may act on behalf of the Principal Investigator.
Study Details: This study is being conducted at the Muma College of Business. The purpose of
the study is to examine the human factor that drives and enables cyberspace insider threat
activities. The study aims to identify insider threat driver information related to three distinct
areas: cultural, technological, and individual, to gain a better understanding of the problem area.
The research will include a single 30-45-minute interview with senior information technology,
information security, and cybersecurity practitioners.
Participants: You are being asked to participate because you are employed as full-time
information technology, information security, and cybersecurity practitioners.
Voluntary Participation: Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to participate and may
stop your participation at any time. There will be no penalties or loss of benefits or opportunities
if you do not participate or decide to stop once you start. Your decision to participate or not to
participate will not affect your job status, employment record, employee evaluations, or
advancement opportunities.
Benefits, Compensation, and Risk: We do not know if you will receive any benefit from your
participation. There is no cost to participate, nor will you be compensated for your participation.
This research is considered minimal risk. Minimal risk means that study risks are the same as
the risks you face in daily life.
Confidentiality: Even if we publish the findings from this study, we will keep your study
information private and confidential. Anyone with the authority to look at your records must
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keep them confidential.

Why are you being asked to take part?
You are being asked to participate because you are employed full-time as either an information
technology, information security, or cybersecurity practitioner. You have valuable insights,
experiences, and opinions on the challenges of insider threat activities. You also have great
insight into processes and procedures that remediate cyberspace insider threat activities.
Study Procedures
This study will not be conducted during regular business hours. If you take part in this study, you
will be asked to participate in a 30-45-minute interview by phone or video call at a time that is
convenient for you. The questions will focus on insider threat activities. There is no preparation
on your behalf for the interview. The interview will be recorded and transcribed for analysis. No
personal identifying data will be collected or linked to the data in any way. The only people who
will be allowed to see these records are: Marcus Green (Principle Investigator), Eric Eisenberg,
Ph.D. (Dissertation Committee Chair), Priya Dozier D.B.A. (Dissertation Committee Chair),
David Howard, M.A. (Dissertation Committee Statistician), and The University of South Florida
Institutional Review Board (IRB).
Alternatives / Voluntary Participation / Withdrawal
You do not have to participate in this research study. You should only take part in this study if
you want to volunteer. You should not feel that there is any pressure to take part in the study.
You are free to participate in this research or withdraw at any time. There will be no penalty or
loss of benefits you are entitled to receive if you stop taking part in this study. The decision to
participate or not to participate will not affect your job status.
Benefits and Risks
You will receive no benefit from this study. This research is considered to be of minimal risk.
That means that the risks associated with this study are the same as what you face every day.
There are no known additional risks to those who take part in this study.
Compensation
You will receive no payment or compensation for participating in this study.
Privacy and Confidentiality
We will do our best to keep your records private and confidential. We cannot guarantee absolute
confidentiality. Your personal information may be disclosed if required by law. Certain people
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may need to see your study records. The only people who will be allowed to see these records
are: Marcus Green (Principle Investigator), Eric Eisenberg, Ph.D. (Dissertation Committee
Chair), Priya Dozier D.B.A. (Dissertation Committee Chair), David Howard, M.A. (Dissertation
Committee Statistician), and The University of South Florida Institutional Review Board (IRB).
Your information or samples collected as part of the research, even if identifiers are removed,
will NOT be used or distributed for future research studies.
We may publish what we learn from this study. If we do, we will not include your name. We will
not publish anything that would let people know who you are.
Data collected for this research will be stored at the Muma College of Business, located at the
University of South Florida in the United States.
Contact Information
If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about this study, call Marcus Green at 907750-3871. If you have questions about your rights, complaints, or issues as a person taking part
in this study, call the USF IRB at (813) 974-5638 or contact the IRB by email at RSCHIRB@usf.edu.
I freely give my consent to take part in this study. I understand that by proceeding with this
survey, I agree to take part in research, and I am 18 years of age or older.
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Appendix B: Interview Schedule
Purpose:

Previous literature reviews revealed a number of human factors related to insider threats
and the associated risk. Research has established a list of human factors, based on this
researcher’s practitioner experience, there is reason to believe the list is incomplete and there
potentially are more factors to be uncovered. This led to further examination of the problem area.
Pilot interviews with cybersecurity industry practitioners returned information that shows the
possible existence of more human risk factors. Information also revealed the opportunity to
identify related factors that drive employees to commit both malicious and non-malicious insider
activities. This researcher believes there is also an opportunity to identify drivers related to the
human risk factors. The research will be exploratory and will focus on human risk factors
associated with and drive insider threats within cyberspace. The research will additionally look
at three specific areas: cultural, technological, and individual.
RQs:

The RQs to drive investigation will be:
•
•

RQ1: What are the cultural, technological, and individual factors that drive cyberspace
insider threats?
RQ2: What are mitigation techniques that reduce cyberspace insider threats?

Interview Questions:

1. Rapport Building & Employment Position Information Gathering
• Tell me about your IT/IS/Cyber experience?
• How long have you worked in IT/IS/Cyber?
• What attracted you to the IT/IS/Cyber profession?
• What is your current IT/IS/Cyber role? How long have you held that role?
• What normal duties are associated with your current role?
• What type of industry are you employed?
2. Questions related to Insider Threat Incidents
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

Here is the definition of insider threat incidents (ITI) according to CISA. Based on this
definition, tell me about the last time you dealt with an insider threat incident as a
practitioner? As a Leader? As a User?
What kind of ITIs have you experienced in the past? What were you thinking when the
ITI occurred? What were your actions? What did you feel?
What’s another ITI that comes to mind that you experienced in the past? What were you
thinking when this ITI occurred? What were your actions? What did you feel?
In my experience, ITI activities are often hard to identify or categorize. What has been
the most critical human risk element associated with cyberspace insider threats?
Tell me about a time when you were involved in some way with this element? (The
element from the above answer)
In your experience, what has been another important human behavior associated with
cyberspace insider threats?
Tell me about a time when you were involved in some way with this behavior? (The
factor from the above answer)
Social Engineering is currently one of the most utilized techniques used by malicious
actors who want access to a system or network. This technique takes advantage of a
vulnerability, the human as a risk factor in this case, by enticing the end-user into making
a mistake. What are your experiences with this type of exploit?
There are many ways to mitigate human risk factors that drive insider threats within the
cyberspace, what have you done to successfully defend against these threats?
What lessons have you learned about what works more generally in decreasing human
behaviors that enable cyberspace insider threats?
What are your thoughts on the best way to combat social engineering exploits?
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